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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
A FRESH LOOK AT DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
CHOICES: FIRM INTERNATIONAL COHERENCE AND HOME-HOST COUNTRY 
RELATEDNESS 
by 
Sokol Celo 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Aya Chacar, Major Professor 
Understanding how decisions for international investments are made and how this 
affects the overall pattern of investments and firm’s performance is of particular 
importance both in strategy and international business research. This dissertation 
introduced first home-host country relatedness (HHCR) as the degree to which countries 
are efficiently combined within the investment portfolios of firms. It theorized and 
demonstrated that HHCR will vary with the motivation for investments along at least two 
key dimensions: the nature of foreign investments and the connectedness of potential host 
countries to the rest of the world.  
Drawing on cognitive psychology and decision-making research, it developed a 
theory of strategic decision making proposing that strategic solutions are chosen close to 
a convenient anchor. Building on research on memory imprinting, it also proposed that 
managers tend to rely on older knowledge representation. In the context of international 
investment decisions, managers use their home countries as an anchor and are more likely 
to choose as a site for foreign investments host countries that are ‘close’ to the home 
vi 
 
country. These decisions are also likely to rely more strongly on closeness to time 
invariant country factors of historic and geographic nature rather than time-variant 
institutions. Empirical tests using comprehensive investments data by all public 
multinational companies (MNC) worldwide, or over 15,000 MNCs with over half a 
million subsidiaries, support the claims.  
Finally, the dissertation introduced the concept of International Coherence (IC) 
defined as the degree to which an MNE’s network comprises countries that are related. It 
was hypothesized that maintaining a high level of coherence is important for firm 
performance and will enhance it. Also, the presence of international coherence mitigates 
some of the negative effects of unrelated product diversification.  Empirical tests using 
data on foreign investments of over 20,000 public firms, while also developing a home-
host country relatedness index for up to 24,300 home-host pairs, provided support for the 
theory advanced. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the core of most dominant theories of foreign investment is the view of the 
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) as a complex structure that capitalizes on the 
imperfections of markets for intermediate products through market internalization 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 2007). While successful in explaining the existence 
of the MNE, and the analysis of alternative modes of foreign market entry (Buckley & 
Casson, 2009), these theories of foreign investment assume rationality in decision making 
and mostly ignore the cognitive limitations of the managers that ultimately make the 
decisions (Aharoni, 2010). This is a particularly important point in the context of 
international investment location decisions, which are characterized by a very high level 
of complexity and a large degree of information processing requirement (e.g., Bouquet, 
Morrison & Birkinshaw, 2009). This dissertation looks at the decision making for such 
investments from cognitive perspective and argues that cognitive limitations of managers 
and heuristics they employ are, at least partly, responsible for the inter-country pattern of 
investments that we observe.  This pattern, in turn, when used to describe firm-level 
international investment decision, helps explain the performance of MNEs. In Chapter 2 
of the dissertation a reconceptualization of the notion of country relatedness is proposed 
and it is argued that this novel approach is a superior way to describe the aggregate 
pattern of international investments. In Chapter 3, the different heuristics and cognitive 
limitations in operation during the decision making process for international investments 
are examined, theory is built, and empirical tests are conducted on the role that such 
limitations have for the observed pattern of country relatedness. Finally, in Chapter 4 
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country relatedness is applied to the firm level and the question is examined whether it is 
beneficial for the firm to operate in related countries.  
Country Relatedness 
 
Contrary to the impression created by predictions of a “borderless world” 
(Ohmae, 1990) and “the end of nationality” (Reich, 1990), there is evidence that national 
borders still matter and that the importance of geography and history has not disappeared 
(Ghemawat, 2001; Jones, 2006a; Subramanian & Lawrence, 1999). An investigation of 
trade and investment flows suggests that international business can be described more as 
regionalized than globalized (e.g., Rugman, 2000). Ghemawat (2003: 139) also argues 
that cross-border integration is far from complete and describes instead a semi-globalized 
world in which the barriers to market integration while not high enough to insulate 
countries completely do also not allow complete integration. This intermediate level of 
globalization calls for attention to locational differences and gives international business 
strategy its distinctive content (e.g., Ricart, Enright, Ghemawat, Hart, & Khanna, 2004).  
However, describing the differences or similarities among countries is not an easy 
task in the light of the multitude of approaches and dimensions that exist and can be used. 
In fact, research in economics, sociology, ethnography, and political science, to mention 
a few, has enlightened our understanding and provided different approaches to describing 
country differences. However, when applied in the context of international investments, 
these approaches seem to have several commonalities and make similar assumptions. 
First, country differences are combined to create an all encompassing, one-dimensional 
construct, which mostly uses the metaphor of ‘country distance’. Second, country 
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distances are part of an exogenously determined background and firms and their 
managers passive players that take these differences as given and not-negotiable. And 
finally, from a methodological point of view, all the approaches confront the researcher 
with the same type of unresolved questions, such as using objective vs. subjective or 
macro vs. micro measures, and whether certain properties inherent to the ‘distance’ 
construct, such as symmetry can be extended to country distance concept. 
Recent research has already started to question many of these assumptions and to 
challenge the way how country differences are conceptualized and used. For instance, 
despite offering a comfortable way to deal with complex problems (e.g., Hofstede, 1996) 
one-dimensional indices of distance do not allow for the investigation of differential 
effects that various components might have on firm strategy and performance (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002). Also, conceptualizations of country distance that do not involve the 
decisions made by real managers are not able to reproduce the dynamic interaction of 
MNEs with their host country environments (e.g., Shenkar, Luo, & Yeheskel, 2008) and 
disregard the fact that strategies are formulated by managers based on their perceptions of 
markets and the fit with their firm specific resources (Tallman, 1992). Finally, as many 
authors have argued, and empirical evidence has demonstrated, several of the 
assumptions made in the research on country distance are violated in the real world (e.g., 
Brock, Shenkar, Shoham, & Siscovick, 2008; Chapman, Gajewska-De Mattos, Clegg, & 
Buckley, 2008; Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2001; Selmer, Chiu, & Shenkar, 2007; Shenkar, 
2001). 
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, an attempt is made to address several of the 
concerns mentioned earlier by offering a fundamentally new way of conceptualizing and 
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measuring country differences. It shifts the focus from country distance to home-host 
country relatedness (HHCR), defined as the degree to which countries are efficiently 
combined within the investment portfolios of real firms. As such, it explicitly 
acknowledges that country relatedness is the result of the interaction between factors 
external to the firm, including national factors and competition, and the managers who 
make and implement international investment decisions (e.g., Bryce & Winter, 2009). In 
Chapter 2, the properties of HHCR are examined by building theory and testing 
empirically the claims that HHCR is asymmetric, it differs for Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) vs. Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI), and that country relatedness, 
while inherently a characteristic of a home-host country pair, is influenced by the 
relatedness of the host country to the rest of the world.      
 
What explains the pattern of Country Relatedness 
 
In Chapter 2 it is argued that the best way to describe how countries differ, or are 
related in the context of international investments, is by observing what real firms do. 
The logical question that follows is why do we observe a certain pattern of HHCR? This 
question is addressed in Chapter 3 and is part of a broader question, 'Why do countries 
differ?’ and this is, or ought to be, the fundamental question in international business 
strategy (Ghemawat, 2001; Ricart et al., 2004).  
As noted earlier there are many dimensions along which countries may differ. 
Previous research has expressed the need for integrative and comprehensive frameworks 
(Berry, Guillen, & Zhou, 2010; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Ghemawat, 2001), but also 
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pointed out that the choice should be driven by the research question in hand (Kostova, 
1996; Ricart et al., 2004). This research helps identify different relevant dimensions of 
country differences as antecedents of HHCR. However, in order to predict which 
countries are chosen more frequently and which criteria are used to make the choices, I 
turn the attention to the decision making process and the cognitive constraints of 
managers that are responsible for those decisions (Aharoni, 2010; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). While the presence of such cognitive constraints for humans in general and 
managers in particular has been long demonstrated (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Dutton 
& Jackson, 1987), how they translate into certain patterns of decision making in the 
context of international investments is less investigated. In Chapter 3 research in 
cognitive psychology, as well as on memory imprinting, is built upon to investigate the 
role of bounded rationality and the systematic reliance on heuristics and biases on 
decision making for international investments. More precisely, it is first asked whether or 
not managers are biased towards choosing, as investment locations, host countries that 
are close to a convenient anchor and it is put forth that the home country is such an 
anchor. Next, an investigation of the factors that are used to determine ‘closeness’ 
between home and host country is conducted that distinguishes between two groups of 
factors: i) historical and time invariant factors, such as geographic distance or colonial 
ties, and ii) time varying institutional factors, typically changing frequently. It makes the 
prediction that time invariant factors, or differences among countries in terms of such 
factors, will be more salient in the minds of the managers and hence more important in 
predicting their choices.  
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How do country differences matter for MN-performance? 
 
While in Chapter 2 and 3 descriptions and explanations of the pattern of 
relatedness between countries in the context of international investments are made, in 
Chapter 4 a focus on the implications of country relatedness for MNE-performance. Just 
as strategy research distinguishes between related and unrelated industry diversification, 
an MNE can have operations in countries that are related or unrelated. This degree of 
relatedness among different locations results in a certain degree of location-specificity, 
which should be balanced against other types of specificity such as that related to 
knowledge or technology (e.g., Ghemawat, 2003). In Chapter 4 the concept of 
International Coherence, the degree to which an MNE operates in related countries, is 
introduced as a way to capture the location-specificity associated with the network of an 
MNE and how it influences MNEs’ performance is investigated. Different from previous 
research on multinationality and performance that focuses on the impact of internal 
resources configurations, such as scope, degree on performance (e.g., Contractor, Kundu, 
& Hsu, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Tallman & Li, 1996), International 
Coherence describes the fit between the resources and the external environment. This 
type of coherence, or an emphasis on “operations across multiple locations that are 
distinct from, but not entirely independent of, each other” (Ghemawat, 2003: 147), makes 
research in international business distinct from mainstream strategy research (Ricart et 
al., 2004). The concept of International Coherence is built on the concept of country 
relatedness described in Chapter 2. As such, it is distinct from the concept of institutional 
complexity (e.g., Goerzen & Beamish, 2003) in that it accommodates both fundamental 
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types of value-adding international diversification strategies: exploiting the similarities 
across countries and arbitraging, or exploiting differences among countries (e.g., 
Ghemawat, 2003). 
In Chapter 4 it is proposed that MNEs capitalize on their unique, rare, and 
valuable resources (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1979) by developing over time the resources 
and capabilities that best fit their current external environment. For an MNE, the 
reutilization of existing resources and capabilities in a new environment (Penrose, 1959) 
is more likely to lead to superior performance when the new environment is somewhat 
related to the firms’ current external environment.  Hence a high level of International 
Coherence facilitates the transfer of firms’ location-specific resources and capabilities 
from one specific location to others within the MNEs network and leads to competitive 
advantage for MNEs (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003). 
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II. HOME-HOST COUNTRY RELATEDNESS 
 
Introduction 
“Similarity plays a fundamental role in theories of knowledge and 
behavior. It serves as an organizing principle by which individuals 
classify objects, form concepts, and make generalizations” (Tversky, 
1977: 327). 
 
The international business literature has seen a growing interest in the concept of 
country distance fueled in part by a renewed interest in location (Dunning, 1980, 1998; 
Porter, 1990). Country distance is generally defined by single drivers that are external to 
the firm such as culture (e.g., Jensen & Szulanski, 2004) or geography (e.g. Kang & Kim, 
2010), or sets of drivers such as national institutions (e.g., Kostova, 1996; Xu & Shenkar, 
2002). Much research has examined distance and its consequences from gravity models 
to institutional theory and research on cultural distance, although several scholars note 
that the question of how to determine country distance is underexplored (e.g., Verbeke & 
Brugman, 2009).  
In this study, we shift the focus to country relatedness, rather than distance, which 
we define as the degree to which countries are efficiently combined within the investment 
portfolios of real firms. While the distance studied in past work may be determined in an 
objective fashion and independent of firm actions, country relatedness on the other hand 
is not. Unlike past research, we argue that just as industry relatedness cannot be 
determined independently of firm actions (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994), 
country relatedness cannot be considered as exogenous to firms. Our conceptualization of 
country relatedness explicitly acknowledges the relationship between factors external to 
the firm, including national factors and competitive interaction, and the managers who 
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make and implement international investment decisions with resources at hand (Bryce & 
Winter, 2009). Hence, country relatedness is best revealed by the actual patterns of 
international investments made by multinational firms between any two countries.  
We do not speculate as to the underlying nature of the attraction among countries 
but rather rely on the fact that firms from one home country, rightly or wrongly, make 
investments in particular host countries. Subsequently, the survival principle (e.g., 
Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Teece et al., 1994) suggests that competitive forces and 
strategic realignments within firms will lead some to remain in those countries and others 
to withdraw. Ultimately, the observed pattern of investments from any one home to any 
one host country represents what has ‘survived’ over time, or country relatedness. 
We also hypothesize that country relatedness is asymmetric, in line with some 
growing voices within the country distance research (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; 
Drogendijk & Zander, 2010; Håkanson & Ambos, 2010; Shenkar, 2001; Tung & 
Verbeke, 2010). We specifically argue that such an asymmetry is likely due to differing 
home nation economic factors, informal and formal institutions, and ensuing path 
dependencies. We hence label the concept proposed home-host country relatedness 
(HHCR).  
We next propose that HHCR, even in the narrow context of international 
investments, is not an absolute measure but will vary with the investment motivations of 
firms. These motivations are likely to differ at least along two essential dimensions: the 
nature of the investments made and the connectedness of the host country. First, 
investments can be of a portfolio-type or foreign direct investment (FDI). While the 
motives of FDI include obtaining return through both the financial contribution and 
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transfer of intangible assets by maintaining control, the motives of foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI) are financial returns with no intent for influence or control (e.g., 
Wilkins, 1999). These differences translate into differing managerial and other resource 
requirements, and risk levels, which we propose lead to differing levels of HHCR. 
Second, countries with higher levels of connectedness may be more attractive as host 
sites and could serve as potential bridges to other international business investments 
(Neumayer & Plümper, 2010). Hence, we hypothesize that HHCR is likely greater for 
host countries with greater levels of connectedness to other countries, which we define as 
the degree to which a country – as a home country – is related to other countries in terms 
of international investments. 
Following our theoretical review below of research relevant to country 
relatedness, and our conceptual development, we present the details of our study and our 
results. The results obtained support our hypotheses. We believe that the home-host 
country relatedness concept, focused on efficient combinations of countries within actual 
firms, provides a novel way to examine the attractiveness of countries for international 
investments, albeit borrowed from work on industry relatedness (Bryce & Winter, 2009; 
Lien & Klein, 2009; Teece et al., 1994). Through the required empirical work, we also 
ultimately provide several outcome-based measures of HHCR that complement current 
indices of country distance and expand their coverage, allowing for truly global research 
(Franke & Richie, 2010; Tung & Verbeke, 2010).  
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Literature Review 
 
Country Distance and MNC Investments 
Environmental conditions external to MNCs’ operations are extremely crucial to 
their success (e.g., Byé, 1958; Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010). More specifically, the 
distance from a home to a host country is seen as an important element adding 
complexity to MNC operations. For example, Buckley and Casson (1976) highlighted 
that social and linguistic dissimilarities among regions increase the costs of resource 
transfer while in contrast, a low cultural, administrative, geographic and economic 
distance (Ghemawat, 2001), despite reducing arbitraging and network externality 
benefits, may facilitate knowledge transfer and absorption in practice (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2004). Three research streams are concerned with explaining foreign 
investments and firms’ international activities in relationship to country distance, namely 
gravity models, cultural and psychic distance research, and institutional theory of 
international business. This research, reviewed below, has proposed in one way or 
another that greater distance will decrease these investments and activities, along with 
their success.  
 
Gravity Models on Country Relatedness  
Gravity models (e.g., Anderson, 1979; Tinbergen, 1962) seek to explain 
international trade and foreign direct investment patterns at the home-host country level, 
by examining time invariant elements of a historical and geographic nature, such as 
language, country size, and geographic distances among countries. They trace back to the 
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Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade theory (e.g., Leamer, 1995) and subsequent formal 
horizontal (Markusen, 1984) and vertical (Helpman, 1984) models of FDI. These models 
posit that, like the gravity law in physics, the economic interaction between any two 
countries, a concept similar to country relatedness, is positively related to their economic 
‘mass’ and negatively to their ‘distance’ (e.g., Ricart et al., 2004).  
In this work, trade flows among countries are primarily a function of each 
country’s GDP (economic mass) and of the geographic distance among them. In addition, 
this research stream emphasizes the distance among time-invariant or slowly changing 
institutional elements including skilled labor endowments, trade and investment costs, 
and language (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer, 2007). More recent research in this 
area has attended to membership in regional political and economic agreements (e.g., 
Baltagi, Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2008), and spatial dependence (when choices made in a 
unit of analysis depend on the choices made in other units) (e.g., Blonigen, Davies, 
Waddell, & Naughton, 2007; Neumayer & Plümper, 2010), as additional gravity 
elements.  
Gravity models have found empirical support in research aiming to explain the 
drivers of bilateral FDI between pairs of countries (Ricart et al., 2004) and have given a 
robust empirical description of international investment patterns (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 
2007). Their success indicates that the elements driving gravity may also underlie home-
host country relatedness.  
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Cultural and Psychic Distance on Country Relatedness  
Cultural or psychic distance research has suggested that operating in culturally 
distant countries may result in differences in organizational characteristics (Kogut & 
Singh, 1988), higher costs of doing business abroad (Hymer, 1976), or increased 
liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). Entry mode choices for international 
investments may reflect attempts to minimize cultural distance between parent and host 
countries (e.g., Kogut & Singh, 1988). Further, once those choices are made, cultural 
distance is expected to influence factors such as FDI performance (e.g., Tihanyi, Griffith, 
& Russell, 2005) and knowledge transfer (e.g., Reus & Lamont, 2009; Sarala & Vaara, 
2010).  
Paralleling cultural distance studies, Beckerman (1956: 38) argued that: “it is 
probable that the manner in which the purchases of raw materials by a firm are 
distributed geographically will depend partly on the extent to which foreign sources have 
been personally contacted and cultivated.” This emphasis on “non-economic” cost 
factors, or psychic distance was echoed in Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975: 308) 
and beyond. This research strand argues that MNCs seize expansion opportunities in the 
neighborhood of their existing knowledge base(s) by choosing countries that are 
‘psychically’ close, suggesting that psychic and cultural distance may be additional 
elements that drive country relatedness.  
Hofstede’s work (1980) on quantifying culture and the Kogut and Singh (1988) 
index played instrumental roles in these two research traditions, albeit offering 
contradicting theoretical predictions regarding the role of culture (see Tihanyi et al., 2005 
for a review). The ever growing body of research in this area indicates its traction and 
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popularity, albeit researchers have critiqued the definitions and subjective interpretations 
of the cultural and psychic distance concepts and their measurement (e.g., Drogendijk & 
Zander, 2010; Håkanson & Ambos, 2007; Tung & Verbeke, 2010). 
 
Institutional Theory on Country Relatedness  
Institutional theory has been used to pinpoint how differences between the 
institutions of two countries impact important firm outcomes (e.g., Kostova, 1999). 
Equating the institutional environment to national boundaries and drawing on North 
(1990) and Scott’s (1995) work on institutions, international business scholars have 
highlighted the need to bridge across institutions for MNC success (e.g., Berry et al, 
2010; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; Westney & Zaheer, 2001). Kostova’s (1996) main 
proposition, consistent with the research stream that followed, is that a large institutional 
distance increases MNC difficulties in understanding host environments and their 
legitimacy requirements and the need to adapt organizational practices and capabilities to 
host country conditions (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
This school brings one of the most theoretically comprehensive approaches to 
identifying elements relevant to country relatedness, while adding a ‘dose’ of non-
efficiency thinking to this concept (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Unlike gravity models, it is 
hard to identify “stylized facts” based on the growing empirical research available (e.g., 
Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Dikova, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2010). Issues 
such as whether all pillars are considered and what indicators are used to capture them 
are generally left to researchers’ discretion, making comparison across studies 
problematic. Research also indicates that overall institutional distance might be less 
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appropriate to describe country relatedness, since each institutional dimension can 
influence firm behavior differently (e.g., Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, & Svejnar, 2009; 
Gaur & Lu, 2007; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
 
Theory Development 
 
Country Relatedness in Use 
While at first hand, relatedness may seem like the inverse of distance, the term is 
carefully chosen to emphasize differences in the attributes of these concepts. We define 
country relatedness as the degree to which countries are efficiently combined within the 
investments of real firms. Three important features should be noted here. First, we follow 
Kostova’s (1996: 98) suggestion of conceptualizing and operationalizing country 
relatedness in a single context which can help increase ‘its explanatory and predictive 
power’. In our work, country relatedness is used and studied in the context of firms’ 
international investment decisions, while country distance is generally perceived as 
context-free. Second, we build our definition by focusing on country relatedness as an 
outcome of international investments while distance is viewed as a driver for these 
investments. We also do not speculate as to the underlying nature of the attraction 
between two countries but rather rely on the fact that firms from one home country, 
rightly or wrongly, make investments in particular host countries. Specifically, we argue 
that country relatedness is best revealed by the actual pattern of investments between any 
two countries. Even if some of these investments are imperfect or subject to agency 
concerns, the survivor principle (e.g., Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Teece et al., 1994) 
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suggests that they ultimately face competitive forces that lead to their modifications (Lien 
& Klein, 2009). Ultimately, the observed pattern of investments from any one home to 
host country represents what has ‘survived’ over time, or country relatedness.  
Finally, in line with several country distance researchers (e.g., Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006; Håkanson & Ambos, 2010; Shenkar, 2001; Tung & Verbeke, 2010; 
Tversky, 1977), we maintain that country relatedness is asymmetric, considering that 
influencing factors likely differ with home nation factors. We hence label the concept we 
propose home-host country relatedness (HHCR). We formally hypothesize and test the 
asymmetric nature of HHCR. This hypothesis is further developed below, along with 
three others that examine the impact of investment motivation on HHCR.  
 
Relatedness Depends on the Vantage Point 
While countries’ physical distance is clearly symmetrical, the actual overall 
relatedness between two countries, when it comes to international investments, may not 
be. International investment choices are driven by firm and managerial actions. These are 
often impacted by differing national factors including national economic factors, informal 
and formal institutions, and ensuing path dependencies. For example, country wealth and 
size are two of many factors that may alter international investment behavior with firms 
from smaller countries, for example, internationalizing at times faster in their search for 
markets and economies of scale (Hennart, 2007). National culture, one of many informal 
norms, has been noted as a key driver of strategic behavior and choice since it influences 
“the nature of the relationship of an organization with its environment as well as 
relationships among people within an organization” (Schneider, 1989: 149). National 
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informal institutions also likely impact individual risk preferences and decision making 
styles, which ultimately may affect the likelihood of foreign investment success (Luo et 
al., 2001). Finally, formal national institutions and history may lead to many differences, 
such as in firm strategies (e.g., Chapman et al., 2008; Flores & Aguilera, 2007). 
Ultimately, these differences give managers different vantage points and different 
preferences for a host environment (Luo et al., 2001).  
In country distance research, Shenkar (2001) calls cultural distance symmetry an 
“illusion” and demonstrates empirically that the effects of culture on expatriate 
deployment and adjustment are asymmetric (Brock et al., 2008; Selmer et al., 2007). Luo 
et al.  (2001) argue that parent firms from different countries have vantage points with 
different starting home institutional strengths and familiarity levels with the host 
environment. More supporting evidence comes from Håkanson and Ambos (2010) who 
demonstrate that a country’s wealth impacts its perceived distance from a home country. 
Anecdotal evidence also shows that Chinese FDI into Africa differs from FDI patterns of 
other countries that seem to be equally ‘distant’ (Braga de Macedo, Pereira & Lopes, 
2009). 
Hence, differing national factors are likely to be reflected in differing patterns of 
foreign investments and also in differing success rates, ultimately leading to asymmetry 
in country relatedness. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relatedness of Country A to Country B can differ from the 
relatedness of Country B to Country A.  
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Relatedness Depends on the Investment Type: Portfolio or Direct 
We propose that HHCR is likely to differ with the investment level undertaken in 
a host country, considering that motivation for these investments may vary. Theories of 
international investment commonly divide overseas investment into two categories – 
direct investment which involves “a strategic long-term relationship … to ensure a 
significant degree of influence by the direct investor in the management of the direct 
investment enterprise” and portfolio investment, in which “investors do not generally 
expect to influence the management of the enterprise” (OECD, 2008: 10). This is an 
important distinction considering foreign investments are often part of a business strategy 
(FDI) while FPI motives are more likely to be financial returns with no intent for 
influence or control (Wilkins, 1999). FDI and FPI also differ substantially (Dunning & 
Dilyard, 1999), because “(i) FDI includes the transfer of non-financial, as well as 
financial assets; (ii) FDI involves continuing control, while FPI does not; (iii) FDI is 
usually more lumpy and indivisible than FPI; and (iv) FPI tends to be prompted by 
financial returns that are higher abroad than those at home, while motivations for 
individual FDI projects are far broader” (Wilkins, 1999: 56-57). Parent involvement 
designed to give the parent a controlling interest in a foreign subsidiary requires at the 
very least significant time investments from the parent’s top management team towards 
the redeployment and development of significant resources and capabilities into the new 
subsidiary (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976; Chen, Park & Newburry, 2009; Dunning, 
1980; Hymer, 1976; Rugman, 1975). Hence, the motivations for these investments often 
differ as well as the managerial and other resource requirement, ultimately leading to 
differing levels of country relatedness. In addition, they differ in how they interact with 
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the business environment with FPI being highly volatile and sensitive to macroeconomic 
changes (such as GDP/capita) and shocks compared to FDI (Busse & Hefeker, 2007; 
Guerin, 2006). We thus propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: HHCR for FDI is different than for FPI.  
 
Connectedness of the Host Country to the Rest of the World Matters for 
Relatedness  
Motivation for investing in a host country is also likely to differ with the 
connectedness of the host country to the rest of the world, defined as the degree to which 
the country is related to the rest of the world in terms of foreign investment. Host 
countries with higher connectedness can be used as a bridge for further international 
investments by MNCs. For example, Hong Kong has long been known as a gateway to 
investing in mainland China in addition to much of south-east Asia (e.g., Kruthanawat, 
2010). Similarly, with the rise of trade agreements and broader associations among 
groups of countries, firms often use a single country as an initial access point. Thus, firms 
wishing to develop a larger presence in the European Union may first invest in Germany 
or the United Kingdom as a bulkhead before proceeding to invest more broadly (e.g., 
Filippaios & Papanastassiou, 2008). Finally, locations with higher levels of 
connectedness can also be in and of themselves attractive investment locations. For 
example, England, and especially the city of London, is where banks from around the 
world can conduct ‘international’ banking business on location. Hence, we propose that 
an MNC’s decision to invest in a host country is, therefore, not made in isolation and 
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independent from the position that the target host country occupies relative to the rest of 
the world.  
This dependency of relations formed within a dyad on the relations with other 
dyads (Neumayer & Plümper, 2010) is called spatial dependence, and has been used to 
explain patterns of diffusion of bilateral investment treaties (Elkins, Guzman, & 
Simmons, 2006; Neumayer & Plümper, 2010), corporate environmental standards 
(Perkins & Neumayer, 2010), preferential trade agreements (Manger, 2006), and bilateral 
alliance formation (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006). We hence expect the connectedness of a 
potential host country to drive HHCR. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, HHCR is positively associated with the 
connectedness of the host country to the rest of the world.   
 
As a corollary, we suggest that an investing firm may pursue a non-direct path 
when investing in a third country, which is not presently highlighted. The concept of 
betweenness in network theory (e.g., Krackhardt, 1990; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) 
suggests that the shortest path from a home to a host country may very well be via one of 
the investments that the firm has made in another host country rather than via the parent. 
Subsidiaries indeed can and do function as bridges (Granovetter, 1973), helping firms in 
their internationalization processes by establishing a foothold in a region and assisting 
firms in developing capabilities (e.g., Buckley & Gauri, 2004; Parada, Alemany & 
Planellas, 2009). More formally: 
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Hypothesis 4: The shortest distance to a host from a home country can be via a 
third country. 
 
Methods 
 
Inferring Country Relatedness from Firm Actions 
To complete this study, we obtained data from the OSIRIS-database of Bureau 
van Dijk, retrieved in 2009. This database provides information on investments by nearly 
all public companies worldwide and on the level of direct and total ownership (total 
ownership includes direct ownership plus ownership through intermediate firms). We 
extracted from this database the complete set of international investments made by public 
firms, with a foreign investment defined as ownership in a company that is headquartered 
in another country, called the Full Sample. We also created two subsamples: the FDI-
Sample and FPI-Sample. We defined FDI as investments involving an equity stake of 
10% or more (OECD, 2008). This definition is employed by international and national 
accounting standards (including United States Department of Commerce), the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (Razin & Sadka, 2007; Wilkins, 1999). For a 
robustness check, we also used the stricter 50% ownership cut-off for FDI redefined 
(Dunning & Dilyard, 1999) which is considered the ultimate indication of control 
(Goldstein & Razin, 2006), albeit the number of investments with ownership levels 
between 10% and 50% is relatively small. In both cases, the difference between the Full 
and FDI Samples is the FPI Sample. These samples characteristics are summarized in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1: HHCR Measures Used and Sample Characteristics 
Sample Characteristics Full Sample 
FDI-Sample 
(cutoff 10%) 
FPI-Sample 
(cutoff 10%) 
FDI-Sample 
(cutoff 50%) 
FPI-Sample 
(cutoff 50%) 
Number of firms 20,051 18,948 2,465 18,145 5,495 
Host countries 204 204 134 204 184 
Home countries 118 114 88 108 105 
Number of investments 422,877 231,664 181,551 213,686 199,529 
Number of home-host pairs 24,352 23,133 11,687 21,915 19,197 
HHCR Mean -.79 -.80 -.85 -.80 -.84 
HHCR Std Deviation .49 .48 .44 .48 .46 
# HHCR at Max (>=.99) 137 82 106 84 152 
# HHCR at Min (-1) 19,692 18,702 10,133 17,737 16,729 
# of home-host pairs 
excluding HHCR=-1: 4,660 4,431 1,554 4,178 2,468 
 
To create the Full Sample, we started with 44,891 public companies from 134 
home countries with more than one million subsidiaries in 206 host countries. After 
removing subsidiaries without country information (17,214) and subsidiaries in the home 
country (566,143 subsidiaries), this sample contained 422,877 foreign investment data of 
20,051 MNCs from 118 home countries and 204 host countries. To obtain the FDI and 
Portfolio Investments samples, we used only investments for which ownership data was 
available (413,215 or about 98% of the Full Sample). We then used 10% ownership as 
the cut-off between the FPI and FDI Samples, with ownership computed as the 
percentage of direct or total ownership, whichever was available, or their maximum when 
both were available. The FDI-Sample consisted of 231,664 investments (average 
ownership 78.6%) by 18,948 MNCs from 114 home countries in 204 host countries and 
the FPI-Sample of 181,551 investments (average ownership 1.12%) by 2,465 firms from 
88 home countries in 134 host countries. 
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Measures 
Home-Host Country Relatedness: HHCRij(Full), HHCRij(FDI), and HHCRij(FPI) 
are computed each within its sample in two steps. First, we calculate hhcrij, the ratio of 
the actual percentage of investments of firms from the home country i in the host country 
j, compared to the expected percentage when considering investments from the rest of the 
world (see Equation 1 below). hhcrij equals 0 if there are no such investments, 1 if the 
percentage equals that from the rest of the world, and greater than 1 when the first 
proportion exceeds the worldwide proportion. 
 
ℎℎܿݎ௜௝ ൌ
ܫܰ ௜ܸ௝
ܫܰ ௜ܸ∙
ܫܰ ∙ܸ௝ െ ܫܰ ௜ܸ௝
ܫܰ ∙ܸ∙ െ ܫܰ ௜ܸ∙
ൌ ܫܰ ௜ܸ௝ ∗ ሺܫܰ ∙ܸ∙ െ ܫܰ ௜ܸ∙ሻܫܰ ௜ܸ∙ ∗ ሺܫܰ ∙ܸ௝ െ ܫܰ ௜ܸ௝ሻ 
 
Equation 1: Formula for hhcrij 
 
 
where: 
- INVij is the number of foreign investments by firms from country i in country j, 
- INVi•  is the total number of foreign investments from country i,  
-INV•j is the number foreign investments in host country j,   
- INV•• is the overall number of investments worldwide  
 
In a second step, we transform hhcrij into HHCRij using the formula proposed by 
Iapadre, 2001 (Equation 2), considering hhcrij ranges from 1 to infinity for pairs of 
countries that are similar, but only from 0 to 1 for dissimilar countries (Dalum, Laursen, 
& Villumsen, 1998). Such transformation removes the undesirable mathematical 
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asymmetry which can create problems when such an index is used in certain econometric 
specifications so that HHCRij that takes values between -1 and 0 for unrelated or weakly 
related countries and from 0 to 1 for highly related countries. Appendix 1 describes this 
measure and all others used for the analyses. 
 
ܪܪܥܴ௜௝ ൌ
ℎℎܿݎ௜௝ െ 1
ℎℎܿݎ௜௝ ൅ 1 
 
Equation 2: Transformation of hhcrij 
 
This index is a variant of the ‘index of revealed comparative advantages’ 
proposed by Balassa (1965: 99) and used in the context of specialized trade patterns (Li 
& Guisinger, 1992; Porter, 1990; Proudman & Redding, 2000). It captures relatedness by 
examining the observed pattern of firms’ international investment decisions from a home 
to a host country, after market selection, compared to the frequency that would result 
under the random hypothesis. This comparison is based on the survivor-principle (Lien & 
Klein, 2009; Teece et al., 1994), which suggests that host countries that are more 
frequently chosen by actual firms are more closely related to home countries than 
countries that are rarely selected.  
Let us illustrate this measure with an actual example. There are 83,509 U.S. 
foreign investments in the sample, out of which 2,224 are located in Mexico (approx. 
2.6%). In comparison, out of a total of 339,368 non-US foreign investments worldwide, 
3,369 are located in Mexico, or around 1%, which indicates that even after selection by 
competition, U.S. firms have proportionately more investments in Mexico than the rest of 
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the world. This leads to a value of 2.68 for hhcr between the US as the home and Mexico 
as the host country, or .46 for HHCR (Equation 3). Appendix 2 presents HHCR for each 
pair of OECD countries (home countries in rows and host countries in columns). 
 
ℎℎܿݎሺܨݑ݈݈ሻ௎ௌ,ெ௘௫௜௖௢ ൌ
2,224
83,509
5,593 െ 2,224
422,877 െ 83,509
ൌ 2.68	 
Equation 3: Example of hhcrij calculation 
 
Host Country Connectedness HCCi: is the sum of weighted HHCRij for all host 
countries j (Equation 4). This measure weighs the third countries by their potential 
importance for investments in order to capture the predicted connectedness effects 
(whereas the HHCRij measure controls for the size of the country). For instance, the 
relatedness between Austria and Slovakia is higher than that of Austria and Germany 
(which means that the pattern of investments of Austrian firms deviates more from the 
expected pattern in Slovakia than Germany). However, from the point of view of an 
investor who is going to use Austria as a bridge, the link to Germany is likely to play a 
more important role. For this reason, we use as weights inward FDI-flows expressed as a 
percentage of worldwide FDI. For example, in 2006, Germany attracted 3.9% of world 
FDI-flows compared to 0.3% for Slovakia; in terms of FDI-stock, the percentages were 
4.77 and 0.27 respectively. HCCi(FDI), HCCi(FPI) and HCCi(Full) are each calculated 
within their respective samples. 
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ܪܥܥ௝ ൌ෍ݓ௞ ∗ ܪܪܥ ௝ܴ௞		
௞ஷ௝
 
Equation 4: Calculation of HCCj 
 
Where HCCj is the Host Country Connectedness for country j, HHCRjk is the 
Home-Host Country Relatedness of home country j to host country k, and wk is the 
weight associated to country k. 
Bridge to Host Country Relatedness (BHCRij): For each home country i, host 
country j, and an intermediate country k, we define the relatedness of the path i→k→j as 
the Min (HHCRik, HHCRkj) and Bridge to Host Country Relatedness (BHCRij) as the 
maximum relatedness considering all the paths connecting the home with the host 
country (Equation 5; see also Neffke & Svensson Henning, 2008). In other words, to use 
an intermediate country k as a bridge, both the relatedness of home i to host k and the 
relatedness of home k to host j should be greater that the relatedness of home i to host j. 
This measure is conservative compared to other potential measures, such as the average 
of HHCRik and HHCRkj as the relatedness measure for the path i→k→j. 
 
ܤܪܥܴ௜௝ ൌ ܯܽݔ௞ஷ௜,௝൛ܯ݅݊൫ܪܪܥܴ௜௞, ܪܪܥܴ௞௝൯ൟ 
 
Equation 5: Calculation of BHCRij 
 
Control variables: We use for controls throughout home and host country 
dummies and for hypothesis 3, we add the elements of psychic distance proposed by Dow 
and Karunaratna (2006), and described in Appendix 1. 
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Statistical Methods 
We test H1, H2, and H4 using paired mean t-tests and partial correlation analysis 
to control for the fact that observations are not independent of home and host country 
factors. To test H3, we run a specific target contagion model (Neumayer & Plümper, 
2010) with some modifications to address our specific research question. In contrast to 
models offered by Neumayer & Plümper (2010), the model used here (Equation 6) takes 
into consideration the fact that what is a ‘target’ country in the main relationship (our 
dependent variable) becomes a ‘source’ on the explanatory side. The model is: 
 
ܪܪܥܴ௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܪܥܥ௝ ൅෍ߚ௜௝ ∗ ܦ௜௝ ൅ ߳௜௝ 
Equation 6: Statistical model for HHCRij 
 
where HHCRij is the relatedness of home country i to host country j, HCCj is the 
connectedness of host country j, and Dij are different types of distances of home country i 
to host country j, used as control variables. As in other analyses, we control for home and 
host countries.  
A large number of HHCR are at the minimum or -1 (around 80% of observations 
for Full-Sample, 81% for FDI-Sample, and 87% for FPI-Sample), as the investments 
observed from the home to the host are minimal compared to the rest of the world’s 
firms’ investments in that same host country. For instance, HHCRZimbabwe,Albania=HHCR-
Albania,Zimbabwe=-1. Since these observations might be driving the relationships observed, 
we report also the results for the “corrected samples” where such observations have been 
removed.  
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Summary Statistics 
We are able to calculate HHCRij for 24,352/23,133/11,686 country pairs for the 
Full/FDI/FPI Sample respectively. Since many observations have the minimum value of -
1, the mean HHCR is very low: around -.8 for the Full and FDI samples, and -.84 for FPI. 
In the corrected samples, when observations with minimum value are removed, the mean 
HHCR becomes .16/.063/.076 for the Full/FDI/FPI Sample respectively. In comparison, 
HHCR is over .99 in few cases: 137/82/106 for the Full/FDI/FPI Sample respectively.   
HHCRij(Full) is highly correlated with HHCRij(FDI) and HHCRij(FPI) (at .96 and 
.53). The correlation between HHCRij(FDI) and HHCRij(FPI) is .43. The correlations of 
all three (direct) measures with the BHCRij are lower (between 18% and 33%).   
While it is impossible to report all the HHCRij calculated, Table 3 presents the 
results for the OECD countries (home countries in rows and host countries in columns) 
for the Full Sample. France and Luxembourg have the highest number of OECD-host 
countries with which they have a positive relatedness (20 countries for each). On the 
other extreme, Chile, as a home country, has a positive relatedness to a single OECD-host 
country (Mexico). Calculating the maximum for each row (respectively column) provides 
information about the OECD-host (respectively home) country a particular country is 
closest to. For instance, Japan, as a home country, is the closest to host country Republic 
of Korea. However, as a host country, Japan is the closest to home country U.S.  
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Results 
We test the hypotheses proposed and then conduct a series of robustness checks 
using alternative HHCR measures and/or different subsamples. Our results support the 
hypotheses made as detailed below. 
Home Host Country Relatedness is Asymmetric 
To test our asymmetry hypothesis, we first examine partial correlations, after 
controlling for home and host country, between HHCRij and HHCRji for all country pairs 
for which both measures are available. HHCRij and HHCRji are available in both 
directions for 7,140/6441/3484/ pairs of countries for the Full/FDI/FPI Samples 
respectively and their partial correlations are .32/.27/.32 respectively. These correlations 
drop in the corrected sample to .12/.15/-.05 in the corrected samples with 
2,763/2565/1044 country pairs.  
We then test more formally for asymmetry using paired t-tests of means (reported 
in Table 2). The t-tests for HHCRij(Full) vs. HHCRji(Full) and HHCRij(FDI) vs. HHCRji-
(FDI) are significant both in uncorrected and corrected samples, while no significance is 
found for the test HHCRij(FPI) vs. HHCRji(FPI). These results show that albeit HHCRij 
and HHCRij are correlated, their correlations are low and their means significantly 
different, supporting H1 or country relatedness asymmetry for the Full and FDI Samples. 
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Table 2: Paired Two-tailed t-tests for the Asymmetry Hypothesis (H1) 
Difference Uncorrected Samples Corrected Samples 
Mean 
HHCRij 
Mean 
HHCRji 
t-value*) Obs. Mean HHCRij
Mean 
HHCRji 
t-value*) Obs. 
HHCRij(Full) – 
HHCRji (Full) 
-.71 -.74 3.012** 7,140 -2618 -.3181 3.015** 2,763
HHCRij(FDI) – 
HHCRji (FDI) 
-.71 -.74 3.686** 6,441 -.27 -.34 3.6914** 2,565
HHCRij(FPI) – 
HHCRji (FPI) 
-.77 -.78 1.2371† 3,484 -.23 -.27 1.2373† 1,044
* Ha: mean (diff)≠0 
 
HHCR Differs for FDI vs. Portfolio Investments 
To test H2, we also compare partial correlations of HHCRij(FDI) with 
HHCRij(FPI), after controlling for home and host country. This correlation is .31 
(significant at less than 1%) with 11,154 matched home-host pairs but drops to .19 in the 
corrected sample with 3,839 pairs. We then test more formally for differences between 
FDI and FPI using a paired mean t-test, which finds the differences in these measures to 
be significant at less than 1%. The results, shown in Table 3, support H2 indicating 
HHCRij(FDI) is significantly different than HHCRij(FPI).  
 
Table 3: Paired Two-tailed t-tests for the FDI vs. Portfolio Investments Hypothesis 
Difference 
Uncorrected Samples Corrected Samples 
Mean (1) Mean (2) t-value Obs. Mean (1) Mean (2) t-value Obs. 
HHCRij(FDI) –
HHCRij(FPI) 
-.6690 -.8389 32.6 11,154 -.0384 -.5319 36.08 3,839 
HHCRij (FDI) – 
HHCRij (Full) 
-.7964 -.7840 -13.04 23,133 .0125 .0742 -13.23 4,652 
HHCRij (FPI) – 
HHCRij (Full) 
-.8455 -.6616 -39.5 11,687 -.5377 .0126 -46.09 3,905 
* Ha: mean (diff)≠0; All tests significant at less than 1%. 
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HHCR is Impacted by Host Country Connectedness (HCC) to the Rest of the World 
To test H3, we run OLS regressions using the model described in Equation 2, with 
the dependent variable being HHCRij for the Full, FDI, and FPI Samples. To allow for 
comparisons across the models, we used balanced datasets, keeping only observations 
where data for all variables was available. As shown in Table 4, Models M1 and M2 
demonstrate that host country connectedness (measured by HCCi) was positive and 
highly significant for all three samples, after controlling for home and host country 
effects. HCCi explained approximately an additional 3 to 4% of the variance in HHCRij. 
In models M3 to M5, we added the scales of psychic distance (Dow & Karunaratna, 
2006) as control variables, which reduced our samples to 6,407, 6,229, and 4,434 for the 
Full/FDI/FPI Samples respectively. The estimated coefficients of connectedness however 
remained positive and highly significant. Moreover, Wald-tests were highly significant, 
suggesting that removing HHCi from the models substantially harms their fit. These 
results support H3, demonstrating that the degree to which a host country is connected 
with other countries positively affects the decisions of MNCs to invest in that country.  
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Table 4: Explaining HHCR by Host Country Connectedness 
 HHCRij(Full) HHCRij(FDI) HHCRij(FPI) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
HCCj  0.31**   0.19**  0.3**   0.19**  0.32**   0.25**
Diff. in religion    -0.06** -0.07**    -0.05** -0.06**    -0.03† -0.04**
Diff. in education    -0.11** -0.11**    -0.1** -0.11**    -0.1** -0.1**
Diff. in industr. 
develop.    -0.09* -0.03    -0.1* -0.03    -0.05 -0.02 
Diff. in languages    -0.14** -0.14**    -0.14** -0.14**    -0.1** -0.08**
Diff. in POLCON    0.02 0.07    0.02 0.09    -0.28** -0.2* 
Diff in POLITY IV    -0.01 -0.008    -0.01 -0.01    -0.01 0.002 
Diff. in the Political 
Rights    -0.0006 -0.0005    0.007 0.005    -0.007 -0.01 
Diff. in the Civil 
Liberties    0.07* 0.07*    0.07* 0.06*    0.05
† 0.05**
Diff. in Political 
Ideology    0.005 0.02    0.004 0.02    -0.08* -0.02 
Constant -0.79** -0.87** -0.64** -0.64** -0.72** -0.8** -.87** -0.64** -0.64** -0.73** -0.85** -0.91** -0.76** -0.74** -0.83**
Observations 24352 24352 6407 6407 6407 23133 23133 6229 6229 6229 11687 11687 4434 4434 4434 
Adj. R-Squared 0.1733 0.2063 0.2583 0.3505 0.3547 0.1838 0.2165 0.2723 0.3654 0.3697 0.1498 0.1880 0.2373 0.3004 0.33089 
F-test  152.1**   7.18**  
146.3*
*   7.72**  
169.1*
*   
17.22*
* 
Home countries 120 120 72 72 72 114 114 70 70 70 88 88 60 60 60 
Host countries 204 204 90 90 90 204 204 90 90 90 134 134 75 75 75 
† significant at 0.1, * significant at 0.05, **significant at 0.01 
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Finally, to test H4, we compare HHCRij to BHCRij. Reasoning that a firm can use 
an existing FDI as a bridge or an existing portfolio investment as a bridge (although 
possibly less likely), we also compare HHCRij(FDI) and BHCRij(FPI), and HHCRij(FPI) 
and BHCRij(FDI). The correlations between HHCRij to BHCRii for the uncorrected 
samples are not high but significant, with values of .17/.19/.14 when both measures being 
compared are based on Full/FDI/FPI Samples. The correlations for the pairs 
HHCRij(FDI)/BHCRij(FPI) and HHCRij(FPI)/BHCRij(FDI) were .21/.15 for the 
uncorrected samples and .07/.17 for the corrected ones.  
We then test more formally for asymmetry using one-tailed paired mean t-tests, 
i.e. testing whether HHCRij<BHCRij as the alternative hypothesis. As shown in Table 5, 
all the t-tests are significant (p<.01) indicating that HHCRij is smaller than BHCRij. The 
mean HHCRij for the 24,352 observations is  -.79, while the mean BHCRij is .03. Put 
differently, BHCRij relatedness is greater than HHCRij for 79.1% of all home-host 
country pairs, is equal in 16.52% of the cases, and is lower for 4.4% of observations. 
Using corrected samples, we get very similar results. We also conduct more conservative 
tests, in which we omit all observations for which the direct measure was equal to -1 and 
had the same results. These results support H4 indicating that relatedness via a bridging 
country is often greater than the relatedness from the home to a host country. 
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Table 5: Paired One-tailed t-tests for the Bridge Hypothesis 
Difference 
Uncorrected samples Corrected samples 
Mean 
HCRij 
Mean 
BHCRij 
t-value Obs. # Mean DM 
Mean 
IM 
t-
value Obs. # 
HHCRij(Full) –
BHCRij(Full) 
-.79 .03 -200 24,352 -.75 .23 -250 20,330 
HHCRij(FDI) –
BHCRij(FDI) 
-.80 0.02 -200 23,133 -.76 .21 -250 19,384 
HHCRij(FPI) –
BHCRij(FPI) 
-.84 -.33 -80.96 11,503 -.72 .21 -110 6,388 
HHCRij(FDI) –  
BHCRij(FPI) 
-.67 -.31 -53.3 11,173 -.46 .14 -58.3 6,804 
HHCRij(FPI) – 
BHCRij(FDI) 
-.84 .21 -200 11,154 -.83 .27 -240 10,700 
All tests significant at less than .01 
 
 
Post-Hoc Analyses and Robustness Checks 
We conducted several post-hoc analyses and robustness checks of our hypotheses 
using different versions of the measures and/or different subsamples.  
In our main measure of relatedness, we count investments made by firms from 
country i in host country j. A possible drawback of this measure is that some firms tend to 
consolidate their subsidiaries in a particular country into one, so differences may only 
represent firm administrative differences rather than actual country relatedness. 
Therefore, we examined two alternative measures.  
The first measure, like our main measure, is based on counting. However, it 
calculates home-host country relatedness using a count of MNCs rather than a count of 
investments. In this case, we counted the number of MNCs from country i that have at 
least one investment in country j regardless of the level of involvement in that country. A 
potential drawback of this measure is that counting MNCs might bias the results against 
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country pairs that have a big market as a host country, since in such countries it would be 
expected that MNCs operate with multiple subsidiaries.  
The second resembles the main measure in that it is calculated based on 
investments rather than MNCs. But unlike the main measure, it takes into account the 
level of ownership and calculates the weighted number of investments using the 
percentages of ownership as weights. The problem with this measure is that it assumes a 
linear relationship between the percentage ownership and importance. Moreover, 
ownership data are harder to obtain and maintaining the same standards of reliability 
worldwide is difficult.  
The three alternative measures (base plus two robustness measures) were used for 
the Full sample, FDI sample, and Portfolio Investments sample. The correlations between 
the measures were high (above .9 for the FDI sample; above .7 for the Portfolio 
Investments sample; and above .8 for the Full sample) even when we used the corrected 
samples. Together with the significant differences between FDI- and FPI-based measures 
reported earlier, these results suggest that our measures have both convergent and 
discriminant validity. 
Using different measures of relatedness for the asymmetry hypothesis produced 
similar correlations between HHCSij and HHCSji (around .31). The results were also 
confirmed when we applied different measures to the FDI or FPI uncorrected 
(correlations between .26 and .28) or corrected samples (the correlations are all less than 
.1). Results of the t-tests did not change. 
Our finding that country relatedness depends on the type of investment (FDI vs. 
Portfolio Investment) is also robust across different measures of country relatedness. In 
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all potential combinations of measures of HHCRij(FDI) with measures of HHCRij(FPI) 
the correlations remain from .4 to .42 (uncorrected samples) and from .06 to .14 
(corrected samples). Results also are confirmed in t-tests. In addition, we checked 
whether the results were sensitive to the operational definition of FDI and FPI 
investments, by using alternative cut-off points for the percentage of ownership (40% and 
20%). Considering that the ownership level for most investments was below 20% (45% 
of the investments) or above 50% (around 52% of all investments), the measures were 
not strongly affected. The correlation analysis and t-tests using measures based on the 
alternative FDI- and FPI-samples confirmed our original results. 
In terms of H3, we run the same models using different measures of the 
dependent variable and the results were the same. We considered also two different 
operational definitions for HCR, one that takes the FDI-stocks as a percentage of the 
world as weights and another where host countries were given the same weight. The 
results were consistent with the ones reported. Besides using Dow and Karunaratna 
(2006) scales of psychic distance, we included also geographic distance and contiguity, 
legal systems distance, previous colonial links and whether the countries in the dyad had 
been part of the same country in the past. The models explain between 45% and 46% of 
the variance in HHCRij for the Full and FDI samples, and around 35% for the FPI 
sample. The connectedness effects remained positive and significant in all samples (p-
value <.05 for the Full sample and <.01 for the other two samples).  
With regard to H4, our findings remained unchanged when we used the 
alternative measures of HHCR and applied them to different samples. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We defined in this study home-host country relatedness for international 
investments as the degree to which countries are efficiently combined within the 
investment portfolios of real firms run by actual managers. This conceptualization departs 
from past work in four ways. First, it focuses on revealed relatedness rather than its 
elements such as culture (e.g., Kogut & Singh, 1988). Second, it does not make the 
assumption that country relatedness is independent of firms, their resource bundles, and 
competitive interaction. Third, our concept is value neutral allowing for differences 
among countries to function as impediments and/or drivers of complementary 
combinations (see Drogendijk & Zander, 2010: 192). Finally, it takes a dyadic approach 
that emphasizes the previously made asymmetry assumption (see Shenkar, 2001). By 
giving firms a central role in the conceptualization of relatedness, we follow the footsteps 
of Shenkar et al. (2008) who propose a shift from “distance” to “friction” in intercultural 
research, or Tallman (1992: 465) who emphasizes the notion that strategies, in this case 
international investments, are chosen ‘by all-too-human managers to fit certain FSRs 
(Firm Specific Resources) to a perceived market.’ 
We also demonstrated that HHCR is asymmetric since differing national factors, 
including formal and informal institutions, economic factors, and national path 
dependencies, lead to numerous differences in firms and individuals such as differing 
perceptions, motivations, and preferences. These differences are ultimately likely to be 
reflected in differing strategies and patterns of foreign investments by firms between any 
pair of countries and also in differing success rates. Our theoretical arguments are in line 
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with previous scholars who noted problems with symmetry in general (e.g., Tversky, 
1977) and specifically with respect to cultural distance (e.g., Chapman et al., 2008; 
Shenkar, 2001; Tung & Verbeke, 2010). The empirical results are also consistent with 
observed asymmetries in various functional areas of MNC-management such as 
expatriate deployment (Brock et al., 2008) and adjustment (Selmer et al., 2007), control 
modes of cooperation (Lee, Shenkar, & Li, 2008), and joint venture control and 
performance (Luo et al., 2001). Our results also argue for the need to truly consider both 
country distance and country relatedness as asymmetric in international business 
research. 
We also proposed that country relatedness varies with the type of investments 
made and the connectedness of the host country to the rest of the world, because of the 
differing motivations behind such investments. Our results are in line with existing 
research which argues that despite the co-existence of FDI and FPI and their common 
features (Dilyard, 2001; Dunning & Dilyard, 1999), substantial differences exist among 
them (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Dunning, 1980; Guerin, 2006; 
Hymer, 1976; Rugman, 1975; Wilkins, 1999: 99-100).  
Finally, we demonstrated that home-host country relatedness is positively 
associated with the connectedness of the host country, and the degree to which it 
potentially serves as a bridge to other countries. These results are consistent with 
Hedlund’s (1986) discussion of the heterarchical MNC rather than traditional views of 
the MNC (e.g., Egelhoff, 1988; Stopford & Wells, 1972) which underlie current views of 
country relatedness. In this view, the parent serves as a hub and the only center with 
investments, knowledge and control flowing through the spokes to the subsidiaries. This 
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view still holds partially true considering the control maintained by the parent (Egelhoff, 
1988; Newburry & Zeira, 1999); however, we now understand that the modern MNC 
may not have a single center or hub and that the connections among the subsidiaries are 
much more complex (Ambos, Andersson & Birkinshaw, 2010; Birkinshaw, Hood & 
Jonsson, 1998). Recent research has highlighted the fact that subsidiaries play roles that 
involve various degrees of centrality within MNC networks (Monteiro, Arvidsson, & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Newburry, 2000), which vary with their host country.  
These findings are also in line with research on ‘betweenness’ in network theory 
(e.g., Krackhardt, 1990; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Subsidiaries indeed can and do 
function as a bridge (Granovetter, 1973), helping firms in their internationalization 
process by establishing a foothold in a region and assisting firms in developing 
capabilities (e.g., Parada et al., 2009). In fact, we demonstrate that the shortest distance 
between two countries is often via a bridging third country, which is in line with our 
observations of MNCs using particular countries as a launch pad for expansion in a 
particular region (Buckley & Gauri, 2004). 
In addition to these theoretical contributions, we propose an index of home-host 
country relatedness that is complementary to current input-based indices of country 
distance. Developments in research and data availability allow us to provide a method for 
capturing country relatedness that incorporates the judgment and knowledge of the firms 
which make international investment decisions. The indices and methods for their 
calculation make a significant empirical contribution to the country relatedness research, 
allowing comprehensive examination of home-host country relatedness, using a large 
sample of countries, which is a key strategy for improving IB research generalization 
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(Franke & Richey, 2010). The study offers indices of relatedness for up to 24,592 home-
country pairs involving more than 200 countries, compared for example to distance 
studies using the 56 countries for which Hofstede’s dimensions are available or the 62 
societies within the GLOBE study.  
The indices presented capture a multidimensional concept (Pehrsson 2006, 
Stimpert & Duhaime 1997), but are free of researchers’ bias since they will not require 
combining different elements of relatedness into an index with predefined weights (Lien 
& Klein, 2009). The indices proposed however are not context free. They build on actual 
international investments made by firms, following Kostova’s (1996) suggestion of 
focusing on a particular context, which allows for better measurement, albeit limiting 
generalizability.  
We propose in this study to examine country relatedness in addition to country 
distance.  Considering that country relatedness is multidimensional and complex, we 
proposed in this study that it is best observed in use. This conceptualization is novel 
(focusing on the outcome of country relatedness rather than its drivers) and takes into 
account the asymmetric nature of country relatedness. We also argued that even when 
focusing on international investments, HHCR is likely to vary with firms’ motivations, 
which are likely to differ for FDI and FPI. Countries that are more connected to the rest 
of the world will be more attractive as hosts.  
While resource requirements often vary for FPI and FDI leading to a differing 
HHCR, they also vary in a number of other instances. For example, FDI for the purpose 
of R&D may require a different resource redeployment than FDI for the purpose of sales 
or manufacturing, an issue that we leave for future research. Moreover, our focus is on 
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international investments made by firms. As suggested by Shenkar (2001), home-host 
country relatedness for expatriate movement may be different. Future research needs to 
also explore how input-driven measures of country distance drive our home-host country 
relatedness, which is clearly output-based. For example, does psychic distance drive 
relatedness or for which sets of country pairs is psychic distance an important driver of 
home-host country relatedness?  
In addition to the theoretical contributions highlighted above, we propose an 
index of home-host country relatedness that is complementary to current input-based 
indices, allowing comparison across a large number of countries. Our methodology 
recognizes that relatedness is subject to change and allows for a systematic updating. The 
methodology proposed also offers the possibility for replication in other contexts, such as 
relatedness for international country relations or trade. Both would be fascinating areas 
for future research. Albeit our study has not addressed home-host country relatedness in 
all contexts it will potentially benefit future international business research by allowing 
for comparisons across countries around the globe. It may also help practitioners 
determine the likelihood of their international investments’ success, keeping in mind that 
competitive factors may change the level of the indices proposed in the future. 
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III. COUNTRY EMBEDDEDNESS, MANAGERIAL BIASES AND 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
 
Introduction   
 
While most researchers acknowledge economic factors as key drivers of 
international investment decisions, models of strategic decisions and especially the 
standard internalization model tend to be hyper-rational, indicating directly or indirectly 
that firm decisions are driven by the state of relevant decision factors (Aharoni, 2010; 
Buckley, Devinney & Louviere, 2007).  In contrast, decision-making research has 
emphasized the bounded rationality of decision makers and their systematic reliance on 
heuristics and biases that are often universal or shared among country nationals (Jones & 
Wadhwani, 2007; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). To bridge this gap, we build on current 
research in cognitive psychology to propose a decision-making theory that we apply in 
the context of international investments. 
We first propose that international investment decisions, as all other decisions, are 
generally made close to convenient anchors, and that a key anchor for international 
investment decisions, and the focus of this study, is firms’ home country factors with host 
countries chosen to be ‘close’ to the home country.  We draw on past work to identify 
country factors that may determine closeness in addition to economic factors. We group 
these factors into two categories: i) historical and time invariant factors, such as 
geographic distance or colonial ties, which are likely to remain static over time, and 
typically have not changed in the last fifty years, and ii) time varying institutional factors, 
typically changing on a yearly basis and likely to have changed in the last ten years. Time 
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invariant factors include the geographic location as well as relatively stable country 
characteristics related among others to language, religion, colonial history, and legal 
systems. Time-variant institutions are primarily regulatory in their nature and can be 
changed more frequently, including institutions of property rights protection, contracting, 
and those that regulate corporate governance. Building on further research on memory 
imprinting from psychology, we then propose that managers tend to rely on older 
knowledge representation and hence international investment decisions are likely to rely 
more strongly on time-invariant institutional factors. 
Drawing on a database of over half a million investments by most public MNEs 
worldwide, or over 15,000 firms, we find support for our claims.  Country factors are 
indeed a shared anchor that drives investment decisions by firms from any particular 
home country to any particular host country.  Alternatively, firms select international 
investments sites that that are ‘close’ to their home country.  These findings are in line 
with the work of Ghemawat (2001, 2003) on “semi-globalization” and Rugman’s on 
“regionalization” (Rugman &Verbeke, 2004; Rugman, 2005) suggesting that, despite the 
hype, globalization may not be as prevalent as perceived.  We also find that closeness of 
time-variant institutions have little explanatory power in comparison to closeness to time 
invariant factors, in explaining the overall pattern of home-host international investment 
decisions.  This finding confirms the role of ancient history to current decisions 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005, Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001), and more 
generally, the importance of time invariant factors (Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, & 
Naughton, 2007), such as geography, which have mostly fallen out of favor in strategy 
and international business research.  More generally, our findings calls for further 
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inclusion of managerial cognition research into strategy and international business (IB) 
research. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Local Search, Anchoring and Decision Making 
Research on bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958; Nelson, 2008; Simon, 
1955, 1976),  cognitive limitations, biases, and heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 
1974) and further applications of these concepts suggests that both individuals and firms 
choose solutions that are proximate to their anchors, which in turn are chosen based on 
easily available information (e.g., Corner, Kinicki, & Keats, 1994; Olie & Iterson, 2004). 
Further details are given below. 
Humans are hence boundedly rational (Halford, Wilson, Guo, Gayler, Wiles, & 
Stewart, 1994; Simon, 1957) and they use simplifying heuristics, which “reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1124). Tversky and colleagues demonstrated 
the systematic presence of the ‘availability and anchoring’ heuristics, which lead to 
solutions close to the initial position, which also has found support from neuroimaging 
research (Tamir& Mitchell, 2010). Anchors themselves are chosen based on the 
information available with individuals relying heavily on information that is easily 
recalled when making frequency or probability assessments (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Subsequent adjustments are then biased toward the initial values (Chapman & 
Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Kahneman, 2003; Schwenk, 1984; Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1974).  Evidence of anchoring has been found in numerous setting such as 
risk perception (Keller, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006) and doctors’ decisions about 
diagnosis and prescribing (Klein, 2005). In a more market-like context, anchoring effects 
have been demonstrated in auction/negotiation situations (Galinsky, Ku, & Mussweiler, 
2009), entrepreneurial market entry decisions (Moore, Oesch, & Zietsma, 2007), and 
other. 
Local search is not just a characteristic of individuals, but also organizations, 
which “(1) search in the neighborhood of the problem symptom and (2) search in the 
neighborhood of the current alternative” (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963: 121; Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000) and begin their search by examining the data most readily available 
(Moore et al., 2007). Firms resort to local search in the development of organizational 
routines and more broadly organizational learning (e.g., Levitt & March, 1988; March, 
1991; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simon, 1991). Research in the ‘upper echelons’ tradition 
(e.g., Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has also 
demonstrated that top managers’ background, experiences, and values influence strategic 
decisions including corporate change (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994), product 
diversification (Farjoun & Lai, 1997; Pehrsson, 2006; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997), 
international diversification (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000), and product 
innovation (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).  
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Theory Development 
 
Country Embeddedness, Local Search and Country Anchoring 
Focusing on international investment decisions, we propose that a key 
environmental anchor for international investment decisions will be the firm’s home 
country and firms will choose for international investments countries which are ‘close’ to 
their own home country. As detailed below, two considerations drive this proposition.  
First, firms’ top executives are still primarily drawn from firms’ home countries (e.g., 
Jones, 2006) and country nationals are proven to share numerous decision-making traits 
(e.g., Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). Second, executives’ knowledge of the firm’s 
external environment constitutes an important source of available information (Bouquet, 
Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), with the country being a 
common anchor in the context of international investment decisions (e.g., Kogut, 1993). 
Despite tremendous internationalization by firms over the last decades, boards of 
directors, top management teams and especially CEOs still originate from the firm’s 
home country with countable exceptions (e.g., Heijltjes, Olie, & Glunk, 2003; Jones, 
2006, 2006a). For example, our own of the Fortune 250 U.S. companies showed that only 
seven of them had a non-American national at the helm in 2005. Even at the board of 
directors level, or that level which is most international, many studies demonstrate, the 
number of non-nationals is larger (e.g., Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva, 2007) but is still 
relatively small and changing very slowly (Gillies & Dickinson, 1999; Staples, 2007). 
Differences in national cultures have been shown to lead to different styles of 
processing information (Schneider 1989) and different interpretations and responses to 
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similar strategic issues (Schneider & De Meyer 1991).  These differences also lead to the 
use of different criteria and weightings in making strategic decision (Hitt, Dacin, Tyler, & 
Park, 1997). Executives’ knowledge of the firm’s external environment constitutes an 
important source of available information (Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009; 
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), with firms manned by executive that share the same nationality 
likely to rely on similar information and similar anchors.   
In addition, research has shown that the country is likely to be a common anchor 
in the context of international investment decisions. Firms are embedded in a larger 
institutional context that serves as a powerful influence on strategic decisions (Hitt et al., 
1997) and strategic orientation (Chung & Lee, 1989). Dunning speaks about MNC’s 
“ownership advantages” that are in part home nation-specific (1977) and Kogut stresses 
that ”countries differ in their underlying 'organizing principles' of work” so firms within a 
country “share common heuristics” which “embodies the know-how defining a country's 
capabilities” (Kogut, 1991: 33). National institutional factors are also found to lead to 
diversification patterns that are “country-specific” (Kogut, Walker, & Anand, 2002). 
Additionally, we observe significant differences in international entry decisions, 
operation and management of international subsidiaries in the case of multinational firms 
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). In fact, a review by business historian Geoffrey Jones 
(2006, 2006a) concludes that firms’ nationality has become more important in the recent 
decades compared to the end of nineteenth century. 
Considering that firms manned by executive that share the same nationality are 
likely to rely on similar information and similar anchors, we propose that this anchor is 
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less likely to be firm or industry specific but rather country-specific. More formally, we 
propose the following: 
Proposition 1a: A key environmental anchor for international investment 
decisions will be the firm’s home country. 
Considering also that top executives’ attention is in short supply, they cannot 
attend to all the signals that matter (Bouquet et al., 2009), so the solutions chosen are 
likely to be chosen close to a firm’s current position. We hence propose that firms are 
likely to choose host countries that are ‘close’ to their home country. Firms from any one 
country are likely to use heuristics that are shared with other firms in that country, or 
national collective heuristics, leading to similar decisions across firms from any one 
country. Ultimately, the aggregated investment decisions of individual firms at the 
country level indicate that the choice of host countries is driven by similarity/closeness to 
the home country.  More formally: 
Proposition 1b: Firms are more likely to choose countries that are similar/close to 
their home country in making international investment locational decisions. 
 
Older Versus Recent Information and Decision Making 
Going back to research on decision-making, we also find solid evidence for 
systematic memory imprinting in addition to anchoring in decision making.  Recent 
research in this area indicates that in making decisions (Bjork, 2001), individuals are 
more likely to rely on historical and time invariant rather than current information. 
Cognitive psychology research is slowly documenting the biology and mechanisms of the 
brain, suggesting that earlier memory representations and learning become more 
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available over time.  Information and learning acquired early on in life is more likely to 
be stored in long-term memory and more likely to be used (Suprenant & Heath, 2009) 
suggesting that managerial decisions, especially those by the more senior upper echelons 
members, are more likely to rely on relevant historical information. “(O)ver time, access 
to competing memory representations regresses toward the older of those 
representations” (Bjork, 2001: 222).  
A multitude of experiments point to a shift from recency to primacy in the ease of 
access to memory representations corresponding to events or items as time passes, be it 
for remembering lists of items (Knoedler, Hellwig, & Neath, 1999) or recalling events 
from different periods (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In a more market-like 
situation, finance research on stock market reactions has revealed a tendency toward 
under-reaction among investors to newly released information (Della Vigna, 2009; 
Huberman & Regev, 2001).  
In addition to the reliance on older memory representation, individuals are more 
likely to recall information that is consistent with the categories in use (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; Dutton & Jackson, 1987).  Solidified values and mental frames are used not only 
for data collection, but also for analysis (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982: 557). Judgments made 
once on the grounds of historical information might also be used as a basis for later 
judgments, independent of the information on which the judgments were originally based 
(e.g., Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Lingle & Ostrom, 1979). Data from these judgments gets 
incorporated into the strategy, systems, values, and expectations, and reinforced behavior 
of the organization (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995: 7). This phenomena is likely to be 
exacerbated considering i) the limited number of cues or pieces of information that can be 
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used in decision making (e.g., Tyler & Steensma, 1995: 61), ii) the greater level of 
experience of top management teams and hence a greater likelihood of deeply set mental 
models (Musteen, Barker, & Baeten, 2006). In this same vein, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) 
emphasized the relevance of historical factors as antecedents of the managerial dominant 
logic.  
Ultimately, the mental representations which managers use are more likely to 
based on historical information (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982: 557). We draw on this research, 
described below, to propose that firms are more likely to use historical and time-invariant 
factors in determining closeness and ultimately international investment locational 
choices.  Formally: 
Proposition 2: Firms are more likely to use historical / time invariant information 
in making decisions. 
 
Country Anchoring and International Investment Decisions 
If country closeness is a key determinant of international investment decisions, 
what exactly determines closeness? Moreover, which would be the time variant versus 
time invariant factors that are likely to influence firms’ decision? While economic factors 
have been emphasized by all as important, different authors and different streams of 
research have focused on the importance of different additional national elements.  While 
we highlight briefly some of these different approaches below, we chose to follow the 
CAGE-framework (Ghemawat, 2001) which stands for culture, administration, 
geography and economic and straddles both macroeconomic and international business, 
highlighting the importance of both time-invariant factors and national institutions. 
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Macroeconomic research has paid close attention to numerous country specific 
factors that are primarily of time-invariant nature, including geographic proximity and 
contiguity, similarity in religion, historical colonial ties, shared language, and common 
legal roots (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer 2007; Hu, 1995; Nicita & Olarreaga, 
2007; Martin, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2008). The gravity models in which these factors are 
studied (e.g., Anderson, 1979; Tinbergen, 1962) trace back to the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
of trade theory (e.g., Leamer, 1995) and subsequent formal horizontal (Markusen, 1984) 
and vertical (Helpman, 1984) models of FDI. These models posit that, like the gravity 
law in physics, the economic interaction between any two countries is positively related 
to their economic ‘mass’ and negatively to the ‘distance’ between two countries in the 
factors below (e.g., Ricart et al., 2004). While these models seek to explain inter-country 
patterns and do not speak about the managers making individual firm decisions, we 
believe they identify the time-invariant country factors that are likely to be key anchors in 
the mind of managers as they make international investment decisions. 
Within international business research has increasingly paid attention to national 
factors (e.g., Chacar & Vissa, 2005) with different streams of literature emphasizing 
different national factor. For example, one classification has used the product, financial 
and labor market institutions (e.g., Chacar, Newbury & Vissa, 2010; Khanna & Palepu, 
1997). Guillén and Suárez (2005) identify five main approaches to the study of 
institutional context of multinational activity: cross-cultural (Hofstede, 1980, 1991; 
Kogut & Singh, 1988), comparative authority and business systems (Whitley, 1992; 
Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997), political economy of FDI (Gereffi, 1989, 1990), comparative 
corporate legal traditions (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Capron & 
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Guillén, 2009; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, 1999), and political and contractual hazards (Delios & Henisz, 2000; 
Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Henisz, 2000, 2000a). Other authors emphasize the 
importance of combining different dimensions (Berry et al., 2010; Dow & Karunaratna, 
2006). Others have focused on the three pillars highlighted by Scott (1995), regulative, 
normative and cognitive (e.g., Kostova, 1996, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  Within 
that approach much of the attention has focused on the regulative aspects with much 
attention being paid to the political hazards and comparative corporate legal traditions 
(Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Capron & Guillén, 2009). These literatures suggest 
that firms are more likely to seek foreign investments in countries with similar 
contracting institutions, because of institution specific-capabilities developed within the 
firm and the MNE’s ability to transfer best practices to the new institutional regimes 
(Guillén & Suárez, 2005).  
We have tried to be comprehensive in our coverage and use the factors 
highlighted in past research, but grouped the factors differently into two categories in line 
with our theory i) historical and time invariant factors, such as geographic distance or 
colonial ties, which are likely to remain static over time, and typically have not changed 
in the last fifty years, and ii) time varying institutional factors, typically changing on a 
yearly basis and likely to have changed in the last ten years.  We expand on the specifics 
of these factors’ relationships to international investments below. 
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Historical and Time Invariant Factors and International Investment Decisions 
We classified under time invariant factors, the geographic proximity and 
contiguity as well as historical and cultural factors such as language, religion, colonial 
relationships, and legal systems. 
Geographic proximity. Both geographic proximity and geographic contiguity can 
increase the likelihood of international investments for several different reasons.  These 
factors can foster communication (e.g., Frankel, Stein, & Wei, 1997) and reduce 
transportation and communication costs (e.g., Chandler, 1977, 2000; Dunning & Lundan, 
2008; Krugman, 1991; Yates, 2000).  Moreover, neighboring and proximate countries are 
likely to be more salient in the minds of managers (Sjöholm, 1996; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 
2004).  
Common language. Language is a highly time-invariant informal norm (North, 
1990; Williamson, 2000) that seems to be an important attractor for investors and for 
business success, even in the case of trade, which is expected to be less influenced by 
language (Ghemawat, 2001).  
Colonial relationships. Historical country relationships are often the source of 
formal and informal institutions that remain into the present (Acemoglu & Johnson, 
2005), leading to otherwise unexpected patterns such as high levels of intra-
Commonwealth trade and investment not explainable by regional trade agreements or 
geographical proximity (Lundan & Jones, 2001).  
Same Country Historically. Countries that were in the past part of the same 
country, such as the former Soviet Union, present numerous historical and institutional 
similarities (Luong, 2002: 2).  
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Legal system origins. Legal system origins lead to significant differences in 
business and consumer related regulations and in the extent to which they provide 
shareholder and creditor protection and preserve the property rights (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002, 2003; La Porta et al., 1998, La Porta et al., 1999).  
Hence, common legal origins facilitate inter-country transactions (Flores & Aguilera, 
2007; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).  
Religion. Differences in religion have the potential to disrupt the flow of 
information for international business (eg. Dolansky & Alon, 2008; Dow & Karunaratna, 
2006), because religion and values affect individual cognition and influence the 
development of capitalism (Weber, 1930). 
Based on the above, we propose that the following time-invariant country factors 
will serve as anchors for international investments: 
Hypothesis 1: Contiguous countries to the firm’s home country are more likely to 
be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 2: Geographically distant countries from the firm’s home country are 
less likely to chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 3: Countries that share the same language as the firm’s home country 
are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 4: Countries that have historical colonial links to their firm’s home 
country are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 5: Countries that were part of a firm’s home country in the past are 
more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
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Hypothesis 6: Countries that have similar legal systems to their firm’s home 
country are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 7: Countries that have similar religions to their firm’s home country 
are more likely to be selected as foreign investment locations. 
 
Current and Time-Varying Institutions and International Investment Decisions 
We classified under time-varying institutions those responsible for the protection 
of property rights and contracting, institutions of corporate governance related to the 
protection of shareholder and labor rights, and common membership in regional 
agreements. 
Property rights institutions. Property rights institutions are defined as “the rules 
and regulations protecting citizens against the power of the government and elites” 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005: 955).  These institutions may alter or control opportunistic 
behavior and can help mitigate the public expropriation hazards (Delios & Henisz, 2000; 
Henisz & Williamson, 1999). Considering the cost of dealing with differing property 
rights regimes, firms are likely to prefer investing in countries with similar property 
rights.  
Contracting institutions. Contracting institutions are defined as “the rules and 
regulations governing contracting between ordinary citizens” (Acemoglu & Johnson, 
2005: 955).  These institutions are essential in mitigating the risk of private expropriation 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Williamson, 1999). 
Considering these institutions influence the cost of doing business, firms are more likely 
to seek countries with similar contracting institutions.  
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Shareholders’ rights institutions. The degree to which shareholders’ rights are 
legally protected varies significantly across countries (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et 
al., 1999).  These institutions affect the ability of a firm to utilize its capabilities and the 
acceptance of its practices in countries with differing shareholder rights (Capron & 
Guillén, 2009: 807).  
Labor rights institutions. A similar argument can be made in the case of protection 
of labor rights, which include the employment law, collective relations law, and social 
security law (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004: 1339).  
Labor force adjustments are harder to implement in countries with strict protection of 
labor rights, increasing the costs of post-acquisition reorganization (Botero et al., 2004; 
Capron & Guillén, 2009).  
Common membership in regional agreements (CMRA). The foundation of 
European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and other 
major regional agreements, has resulted in the reduction of tariffs and other trade costs 
which is expected to encourage investments among partner countries (e.g., Baltagi et al., 
2008; Brenton, 1996; Fratianni & Oh, 2009).  
Based on the above, we propose that the following time-variant country factors 
will serve as anchors for international investments: 
Hypothesis 8: Countries with greater distance in property rights institutions from 
the firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 9: Countries with greater contracting institutions distance from the 
firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
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Hypothesis 10: Countries with greater distance in shareholder protection from the 
firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 11: Countries with greater distance in labor protection from the 
firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
Hypothesis 12: Countries which share membership in a regional agreement with 
the firm’s home country are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations. 
 
Country Embeddedness, Memory Imprinting and International Investment 
Decisions 
In line with our proposition 2 above, early international research and a large 
strand of research in macroeconomics and political science have emphasized the 
importance of historical and geographical factors to country relations, foreign direct 
investments and trade (e.g., Dunning & Lundan, 2008). We argue that they will also be of 
great importance in the context of international investment decisions. 
The choice of location requires making judgments about similarities across 
countries (e.g., Tallman & Shenkar, 1994). Such judgments are generally ambiguous in 
nature (Farjoun & Lai, 1997), subject to cognitive biases in managerial perceptions 
(Barnes, 1984; Schwenk, 1984) and are based on simplifications of complex information, 
or categorizations (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Such categories are likely to be based on 
early acquisition of information which is often on time invariant historical and 
geographic factors, such as neighbor countries, language, and religion, the elements 
taught in the school and that individuals are exposed to during their whole life. Along 
these lines, Jones and Wadhwani (2007) find that linguistic and historical ties affecting 
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entrepreneurial cognition with international investments of Spanish firms, even from the 
1980s and onward, being disproportionately located in Latin America. Categorizations 
and framing also influence the perceptions of opportunities and threats. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) and subsequent work (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Kahneman, 2003) 
showed that risk taking behaviors change depending on a situation’s framing. Along 
these lines, Toral (2001) analyzes the investments of Spanish multinationals in Latin 
America and points out that the perceptions in those instances were of greater 
opportunities and lesser risks less than other regions or countries while the opposite was 
true for U.S. multinationals. As a result there are relatively fewer investments by U.S. 
multinationals in Latin America, despite the fact that they are better endowed than 
Spanish multinationals (Toral, 2001: 171) and entry into the promising Latin American 
market would make economic sense.  
Ultimately, while many historic and geographic factors have fallen into disfavor 
in the IB literature, we believe that these factors are likely to be the more salient in 
managers’ minds.  Our review suggests that in making international locational choices for 
international diversification, just as in product diversification moves (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986), the choice of the target country is likely to be heavily influenced by historic-
geographic or time invariant institutional knowledge rather than by current or time 
varying institutional factors. As such, we propose that historic and geographic factors will 
have the greater influence on internationalization decisions.  More formally: 
Hypothesis 13: Historical / time invariant country distance information is likely 
to explain more of the variance in home host country international investment decisions 
than distance of time variant institutions. 
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Methods 
 
Data used to test our hypotheses is already described in Chapter 1 (see Table 1 for 
the full sample). In addition, we collected data on different national factors and 
institutions. Because of missing country-level data and the fact that we used a balanced 
dataset to run all models, we were left with 1,705 observations/country pairs with 56 
home and 58 host countries represented. 
 
Dependent Variable: Home-Host International Investments  
We measured international investments as the relative level of firms’ investment 
between a home and a host country, at the country dyad, which they also term Home-
Host Country Relatedness (HHCRij) with i representing home country i and j host 
country. This measure is based on the survivor-principle (SP) (Teece et al., 1994) that 
assumes that countries that are frequently chosen or combined within actual firms are 
more closely related than countries that are rarely combined, after making certain 
adjustments. The aggregation of firms’ decisions in an overall measure seems 
appropriate, considering that in our case the measurement of absolute properties of 
members gives rise to collective properties (Schneider & Andelmar, 1993). Unlike 
typical aggregate measures however this measure incorporates the judgment and 
knowledge of the firms which make international investment decisions and is more 
suitable to test theory on international investment decisions than similar measures based 
on bilateral FDI-flows, since it’s not sensitive to the size of investments. The technical 
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details of the calculation of this measure were described in Chapter I (see Equations 1 
and 2). 
 
Statistical Model 
We used ordinary least squares methodology to test our Hypotheses 1 to 12 using 
the model below and variance decomposition techniques to test for H13. We estimate 
HHCRij, as follows: 
 
HHCRij = α + β1 * (Economic Factors)ij + β2 * (Time Invariant Factors)ij + β3 * 
(Time Variant Factors)ij+ controls     
Equation 7: Statistical model for HHCRij 
 
where β1 represents the effects of economic factors as controls,  
β2 is a vector of coefficients capturing the effects of the various time invariant 
factors,  
β3 is a vector of coefficients capturing the effects of current factors.  
Considering the dyadic nature of data, we assumed that the error within a country 
is correlated and hence clustered the data by both the home and host country. 
 
Independent Variables  
All independent variables are at the country-pair level. They either represent a 
distance, such as the difference in Distance in Shareholder Rights for a home and host 
country, or a descriptor, such as the Geographic Distance between the two countries (see 
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Appendix 3 for a full description of all variables). These measures used for time invariant 
data have been commonly used in macro-economic research (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré, 
Coupet, & Mayer 2007; Martin, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2008; Nicita & Olarreaga, 2007).  
The measures for the time-variant factors were obtained from various sources from the IB 
literature. 
 
Control Variables 
We controlled for fixed home and host country effects.   We also used several 
controls for economic factors that may influence international investments. We controlled 
for the Combined Size of the home and host countries measures as the log of the sum of 
home and host countries GDP or G=GDPi+GDPj and home host Size similarity measured 
by S=1–(GDPi/G)2–(GDPj/G)2.  We also controlled for Combined Purchasing Power 
measured by the log of the sum of home and host GDP per capita or 
Gcapita=GDPcapitai+GDPcapitaj and Similarity in Purchasing Power measured by S=1–
(GDPcapitai/Gcapita)2–(GDPcapitaj/Gcapita)2. Additional controls are also made for 
Human Capital Endowment Distance measured by the absolute value of the difference in 
secondary school enrollment.  This data was obtained from the World Development 
Indicators.  Finally, we control for the fact that one or more countries in the pairs is an 
island with Island=2 for pairs of islands, 1 for one island country in pair, and 0 otherwise, 
a factor that may interfere with geographic distance calculations.  
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Results 
 
Table 6 presents the summary statistics for our measures. The full correlation 
matrix (See Table 7) shows several correlation indices above 0.3 among the independent 
variables, albeit some of these are not surprising. We ran collinearity diagnostics, 
computing the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for all models estimated and it stood 
at 1.51.  All the individual VIFs were less than 4 with the maximum at 2.15, indicating 
low collinearity (Netter, Wasserman & Kutner, 1996). 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
HHCRij -0.51 0.58 -1 1 
Combined Size 26.8 1.29 23.5 30.43 
Size similarity 0.28 0.16 0.001 0.5 
Distance in Work Force Quality 0.85 0.75 0 4.42 
Combined GDP/capita 10.31 0.64 7.7 11.42 
GDP/capita similarity 0.36 0.13 0.04 0.5 
Island 0.31 0.5 0 2 
Contiguous Countries 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Geographic distance (100 km) 74.2 47.75 1.11 197.7 
Common Official Language 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Colonial Relations 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Same Country 0.009 0.09 0 1 
Distance in Legal Systems 0.69 0.72 0 2 
Distance in Religion -0.3 0.94 -1.55 1.53 
Distance in Property Rights Protection 0.2 0.21 0 0.89 
Distance in Contracting Institutions 1.07 0.8 0 4.09 
Distance in Shareholder Rights 1.1 0.83 0 3.54 
Distance in Labor Protection 0.85 0.63 0 3.05 
Common Membership in Reg. Agreements 0.13 0.33 0 1 
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Table 7: Correlations Matrix 
 
  Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) HHCRij 1            
(2) Contiguous countries 0.33* 1           
(3) Geographic Distance -0.38* -0.26* 1          
(4) 
Common 
Official 
Language 
0.17* 0.15* 0.02 1         
(5) Colonial Relations 0.13* 0.14* -0.07* 0.35* 1        
(6) Same Country 0.16* 0.35* -0.11* 0.19* 0.05* 1       
(7) Distance in Legal Systems -0.20* -0.17* 0.19* -0.15* -0.12* -0.08* 1      
(8) Distance in Religion -0.16* -0.13* 0.08* -0.1* 0.07* -0.09* 0.1* 1     
(9) 
Distance in 
Property 
Rights 
Protection 
-0.09* -0.04 0.14* 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.004 -0.04 1    
(10) 
Distance in 
Shareholder 
Rights 
-0.02 -0.03 0.06* -0.07* 0.02 -0.02 0.08* 0.01 -0.05 1   
(11) 
Distance in 
Labor 
Protection 
-0.15* -0.11* 0.04* -0.15* -0.09* -0.09* 0.5* 0.07* 0.02 -0.01 1  
(12) 
Distance in 
Contracting 
Institutions 
-0.12* -0.08* 0.3* -0.11* -0.14* -0.04 0.24* -0.14* 0.09* 0.13* 0.07* 1 
(13) CMRA 0.3* 0.23* -0.49* -0.05* -0.07* 0.09* -0.18* -0.25* -0.26* -0.01 -0.15* -0.12*
* significant at 5% or less 
 
Table 8 shows the test results explaining HHCRij for both TI and TV, or H1 to 
H12. M0 represents the base model with the control variables and fixed home and host 
country effects. Model M1 tests hypotheses related to TI, i.e. H1 to H7, while model M2 
tests hypotheses H8 to H12, which are related to TV. M3 is the full model. As an 
illustration, the estimated coefficient for Geographic Distance is 0.003 (M1 in Table 8). 
Therefore, a reduction of distance of one unit (100 km) causes an increase of HHCRij, by 
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.003. This in turn translates (for a pair of countries that have HHCRij = .5) in an increase 
of 2% of the number of investments in the host country.  
We find highly significant effects and in the predicted direction for almost all 
geographic and historical factors (H1 to H7) except Same Country (when entered 
individually also Same Country has a significant positive). Countries have a higher level 
of relative investments, or ‘are more related’, if they are contiguous or close 
geographically, have had colonial relations, and are similar in terms of religion, legal 
systems, and language.  
We have more mixed results for time varying institutions (M2).  Distance in 
Property Rights Protection (H8) has a positive rather the expected negative effect HHCRij 
albeit that effect is near marginal in the full model. Distance in Contracting Institutions 
(H9) has a negative and significant effect on HHCRij but loses significance in the full 
model.  Distance in Shareholder Rights (H10) has a positive coefficient on HHCRij that 
becomes significant and positive in the full model, which is contrary to our predictions.  
Distance in Labor Protection (H11) has a negative and significant effect on HHCRij but 
loses significance in the full model.  Common Membership in Regional Agreements 
(CMRA) (H12) has as expected a positive effect HHCRij albeit that effect is non-
significant in the full model. 
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Table 8: OLS Results Explaining HHCRij: M1: Time Invariant; M2: Time Varying 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Combined size .03(1.67)† .05(2.34)* .05(2.04)* 0.05(2.61)* 
Size similarity .16(1.34) .21(1.9)† .18(1.44) .22(2.23)* 
Distance in Work Force Quality -.06(-1.31) -.07(-1.73)† -.41(-.92) -.07(-1.88)* 
Combined GDP/capita -.02(-.31) -.23(-0.44) -.05(-1) -.01(-0.25)† 
GDP/capita similarity .38(1.7)† -.08(-.5) .14(.64) -.08(-.05) 
Island  .02(.43)  .02(0.51) 
Contiguous Countries (H1)  .06(6.06)***  .58(5.86)*** 
Geographic distance (H2)  0.003(-9.43)***  -.004(-8.08)*** 
Common Official Language (H3)  .19(3.53)***  .21(3.65)** 
Colonial Relations (H4)  .18(2.73)***  .18(3.04)** 
Same Country (H5)  .22(1.11)  .24(1.17) 
Distance in Legal Systems (H6)  -.07(-4.43)***  -.06(-3.11)** 
Distance in Religion (H7)  -.06(-3.42)***  -.05(-2.85)** 
Distance in Proper. Rights (H8)   .2(2.82)*** .15(2.33)* 
Distance in Contracting Inst. (H9)   -.05(-2.47)* .03(1.45) 
Distance in Shareh. Rights (H10)   .01(.69) .04(2.29)* 
Distance in Labor Protection (H11)   -.09(-4.44)*** -.01(-.35) 
CMRA (H12)   .37(4.35)*** .06(.8) 
_cons -1.38(-2.07)* -1.25(-2.42)* -1.24(-1.8)† -1.54(-2.95)** 
Observations 1705 1705 1705 1705 
Adj. R-Squared 0.3081 0.5017 0.3550 0.5072 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%, *** significant at 0.1% 
 
Table 9 shows the tests results for the relative importance of time invariant (TI) 
versus time variant (TV) factors in explaining the variance in HHCRij or the tests for 
H13. We follow a standard variance decomposition technique, which is sensitive to the 
order of entry into the model.  In the base model (M1) we include all control variables, 
that is the fixed country effects and economic control factors (EF). This model explains 
around 31% of the variance of HHCRij. Model 2 adds TI, which explain an additional 
19.4% of the variance. Model 3 adds TV to the base model and explains an additional 
4.7% of the variance. Model 4 adds both TI and CI the base model. When we compare 
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M4 to M2, TV explain an additional 0.55% of the variance. When we compare M4 to 
M3, TI explain an additional 15.2% of the variance.  This shows that the maximum and 
minimum estimates for TI (and TV respectively) are [19.4%, 19.9%] ([0.55%, 4.7%]).  
The final Wald-tests for adding TV to M2 is also only marginally explanatory power (p-
value=0.054). These results support H13 and Proposition 2. 
 
Table 9: HHCRij Variance Decomposition: Time Invariant vs. Time Varying 
Factors 
 Model R-Square Adj. R-
Square 
Compared 
against 
Added Adj. 
R-Square (%) 
Wald-Test 
(Prob> F) 
1. CE + EF (M1) 0.3102 0.3081    
2. CE + EF + TI (M2) 0.5055 0.5017 M1  19.36 <0.001 
3. CE + EF + CI (M3) 0.3588 0.3550 M1 4.69 <0.001 
4. CE + EF + TI  + CI (M4) 0.5124 0.5072 M1 19.91 <0.001 
5. CE + EF + CI  + TI (M4) 0.5124 0.5072 M3 15.22 <0.001 
6. CE + EF + TI  + CI (M4) 0.5124 0.5072 M2 0.55 0.0535 
Abbreviations: 
CE: Home and Host Country Effects, EF: Economic Factors, TI: Time Invariant  Factors, CI: Current 
Institutions  
 
Robustness Checks, Post-Hoc Analysis and Limitations 
To check the robustness of our results we conducted several additional tests. We 
estimated additional models using different measures of current institutions.  We first 
used Kogut and Singh (1988) to compute ‘cultural distance’ between the home and host 
country, as an alternate instead of our measures of common language and religion. We 
then added to the time invariant factors the Psychic Distance measure developed by 
Håkanson and Ambos (2010). In both cases, the results obtained in regard to the relative 
explanatory power of time invariant vs. time varying institutions remain. In both cases 
the sample was drastically reduced, considering cultural distance is symmetric and 
available for only 67 countries and psychic distance for 261 observations/country pairs. 
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In the models with cultural distance several time invariant factors, including cultural 
distance, are significant in this model albeit not in the full model. The time invariant 
distance that consistently remains significant is that for Legal Systems Origin. In the 
models with psychic distance, Psychic Distance remains significant across all models, but 
in its presence the colonial relations, common language, and distance in religion become 
insignificant. This suggests that using psychic distance would allow for more 
parsimonious models, albeit it is limited to a smaller set of countries.   
In addition, to exclude the possibility of time invariant factors’ effects being 
driven by geographic distance alone, we ran separate Wald-tests for the historical and 
geographic factors. Both tests were highly significant. Historical factors explain 3.6% of 
the variance in HHCRij beyond that explained by the base model and geographic factors, 
while geographic factors explain an additional 10% beyond the base model and historical 
factors.  
We conducted additional tests to try and disentangle, albeit limitedly so, the 
effects of geographic closeness saliency and lowered transportation costs associated with 
smaller geographic distance. To do so, we capitalize on the observation that saliency 
should be evident for proximate countries only while transportation costs should apply to 
all countries. As a result, the overall effects of distance should be more pronounced for 
closer countries. An added squared distance term in the model had a positive and 
significant coefficient at 5% supporting our conjecture. Further splitting the data into 
close vs. distant pairs and running separate regressions lead to significantly different 
coefficients of distance in both samples with the coefficient for close countries several 
times larger than that for distant countries. The results were robust to different 
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specifications of ‘closeness’ (we first defined close countries as those who were 
contiguous, then we considered as ‘close’ also countries less than 1,000 km distant).   
These tests hint to the existence of a saliency effect in addition to cost effects. 
Finally, we reran our models using another asymmetric measure of country 
relatedness based on home-host country exports rather than count of investments by firms 
between countries as the dependent measure. The results were mostly unchanged, albeit 
the portion of variance explained by country effects is lower (about 18%). Absolute 
comparisons between the models are difficult, since the samples size obtained is much 
smaller. Economic factors add around 2.5% to country effects. In contrast to Country 
Relatedness, there is more variance explained both by time invariant factors (24%) and 
current factors (8%). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results obtained in this study support our general theory, which proposes that 
decisions are chosen close to a convenient anchor. We also find support for the idea that 
older knowledge representations are likely used in strategic decision-making. Our 
findings support the idea that strategic moves are influenced by managerial mental 
models and managerial values which become more rigid over time and hard to change 
and may exert stronger influence on decision than current environmental forces (Kiesler 
& Sproull, 1982). While past research has also suggested that managerial mental models 
can become rigid over time (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), this is the first study to 
demonstrate the relative importance of history and geography over current institutional 
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factors in high level strategic decision making in the international business arena.  The 
finding is of great importance to academics and managers alike. On the managerial side, 
we come to question once again the rationality of decision-making and the need to 
address in some fashion the bounded rationality of managers and the use of heuristics 
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006), which are likely to translate into suboptimal 
strategic decisions. However, we are not arguing that managers necessarily make the 
wrong decisions. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1124) argued, these heuristics are 
quite useful, albeit they sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors. Indeed as 
Bouquet et al. (2009) find, beyond a certain threshold, international attention, that is, the 
time and effort dedicated to scanning the global marketplace, may come at the expense of 
other strategic imperatives and harm firm performance. Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr 
(2007) find also evidence of the positive effects of heuristics in decision-making 
processes and performance.  
In the context of international investments, we demonstrate more specifically 
home country is a key anchor in international investment decisions and that historical and 
time invariant information is more likely to be used in these decisions.  Firms are more 
likely to choose host countries that are similar/close to their home country rather than 
distant countries. Specifically, we find that geographic distance has a negative influence 
on international investments in line with previous research (e.g., Egger & Pfaffermayr, 
2004). In addition, contiguity of two countries positively influences international 
investments.  Moreover, we found evidence that the effects of distance likely go beyond 
just the increase in transportation costs (also see Frankel et al., 1997: 71). This result 
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shows that geographic distance sill matters even with dramatically reduced transportation 
and communication (Buch, Kleinert, & Toubal, 2003). 
Common language and past colonial relationships are also found to drive 
international investments.  In line with our findings, past research has shown the 
disproportionate investments by Spanish multinationals in Latin America (Toral, 2001) 
and by Portuguese multinationals in Brazil and Portuguese-speaking Africa (Nunes, 
Bastien, & Valerio, 2008). Distance in religion is found to negatively affects international 
investments in line with empirical evidence suggesting that religion affects the level of 
FDI (Dolansky & Alon, 2008) and corporate disclosure (Archambault & Archambault, 
2003), and that religion is an important factor in predicting variation in creditor right 
(Stulz & Williamson, 2002). 
Finally, dissimilarity in legal systems origins is associated with reduced foreign 
investments in line with past research showing that countries with the same legal system 
are more likely to be the recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2003) and investments by US firms (Flores & Aguilera, 2007). The finding 
highlights legal origin differences as a handicap for international business (Djankov et al., 
2003; La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999). 
When historical and time invariant factors are excluded, time-variant institutional 
distance is found to lead to decreased international investments in line with past research 
stressing their importance (e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2000). Firms are less likely to make 
international investments in countries with greater distance in property rights institutions. 
Firms are also less likely to make international investments in countries with greater 
distance in contracting institutions. This result is in line with past research showing that 
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contracting institutions influence the choice of entry mode (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) 
and that their improvement reduces the governance costs of market leading to more 
exports and less wholly owned subsidiaries (Henisz & Williamson, 1999). 
Firms are also found to be less likely to make international investments in 
countries with greater distance in shareholder and labor protection. These results are line 
with past research showing that the degree of investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998, 
La Porta et al., 1999) and labor rights (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Botero et al., 2004; 
Capron & Guillén, 2009) in a country influence the patterns of ownership, governance 
and financing (Guillén & Suárez, 2005). Finally, firms are more likely to choose as 
foreign investment locations countries with which they share membership in a regional 
agreement. Indeed, the foundation of European Union (EU), North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and other major regional agreements, resulted in a significant 
increase in bilateral trade volumes among the member countries (Baier & Bergstrand, 
2007; Glick & Rose, 2002). However, results on bilateral FDI have not been conclusive, 
considering the reduction of tariffs and other trade costs is expected to encourage vertical 
investments, in which firms split up the stages of production and engage in trade, but not 
necessarily horizontal investments (Baltagi et al., 2008). Empirical results reflect this 
issue with some finding positive effects between regional agreements and bilateral FDI 
(Brenton, 1996; Brenton, Di Mauro, & Lücke, 1999; Levy Yeyati et al., 2002, 2002a) and 
others finding no such effects (Blomström & Kokko, 1997). 
It is very important to note, however, that in comparison to historical and time 
invariant factors current institutions have limited explanatory power, albeit some are 
significant. We demonstrated that international investments between countries are driven 
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primarily by time invariant factors of historic and geographic nature and time-variant 
institutions, in addition to the economic and country-specific factors. Much of normative 
research emphasizes the importance of examining current external conditions when 
making important strategic decisions such as internationalization moves. Similarly, much 
of IB research emphasizes the importance of time varying national institutions in making 
internationalization and trade decisions. This research finds quite a distance between 
these normative prescriptions and actual managerial practice.  Our work shows that the 
present is important but the past matters more for internationalization decisions. The 
explanatory strength of geographic and historical factors provides additional evidence in 
favor for arguments by Ghemawat (2001, 2003) on “semi-globalization” and Rugman on 
“regionalization” (Fratianni & Oh, 2009; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Rugman, 2005).  It 
also provides more evidence about the importance of history to current developments (see 
also Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Jones, 2006, 2006a). The results 
obtained are hence consistent with macro level research within international economics 
and gravity-models examining drivers of foreign direct investment and trade (Blonigen, 
2005), the Uppsala model of internationalization processes (Johansson & Vahlne, 1977, 
1990) with its emphasis on ‘psychic distance’ (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and ‘cultural 
distance’ (Kogut & Singh, 1988) between the home and host country, and recent 
suggestions that ‘distance’ along these cultural, administrative, and economic dimensions 
can affect the attractiveness of foreign markets (Ghemawat, 2001, 2003, 2007). 
It is important to note that our finding does not mean that these time-variant 
institutional factors are unimportant. Two possible and at time overlapping explanations 
for this finding need to be disentangled in future research.  Firstly, time-varying 
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institutions are likely to have their roots in the geographic and historical institutions that 
provide us with possibly better overall or more parsimonious explanations (North, 1991). 
As Acemoglu et al. (2001) point out, the relationship between national institutions and 
performance of the countries might not account for potential endogeneity and differences 
in colonial experience could be a source of exogenous differences in institutions. This 
would call for a rethinking of the drivers of decisions making in general, be it historical 
of current information and is in line with research in population ecology highlighting 
initial imprinting (Boeker, 1989; Marquis, 2003).  This also calls for a rethinking of 
which institutions matter in general or under which conditions the institutions of interest 
in IB research are more relevant. Secondly, managers may be making decisions with the 
‘fundamentals’ in mind.  Considering that current institutional conditions are, by 
definition, in flux, firms may be focusing on perennial factors that are likely to stand the 
passage of time.  Further studies are needed to assess this possibility.  After entry 
decisions are made, based primarily on time-invariant factors, the state of current 
institutions and the ability of the firm to cope with institutional idiosyncrasies (Henisz, 
2003) are likely to become a very important source of performance heterogeneity among 
the multinationals (Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). 
Regardless, this study calls into question our primary focus within IB research on 
time-varying factors while historic-geographic factors are nowadays considered to be 
much less relevant. Managers are subject to bounded rationality in addition to being 
constrained by the idiosyncratic resources of the firm and its worldwide strategy 
(Tallman & Shenkar, 1994), and we need to understand further the impact of these biases 
on strategic decisions. Other future research that may be needed is the examination of 
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embeddedness at all levels on decision-making n general and international investments in 
specific. We recognize that in addition to being embedded in their home country, 
managers are embedded also in the context of their own firm and in their own individual 
characteristics.  How do these three level of embeddedness jointly influence firms’ 
international decisions is unclear.  More generally, it is important that future research 
further includes managerial cognition into the study of strategic decisions. 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL COHERENCE ON MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE 
 
Introduction 
 
Starting with the work of Chandler (1962) and Andrews (1971), strategy research 
has highlighted the importance of fit between the firms’ resources and its external 
environment.  In this vein, research on multinationality has examined the impact of 
internal resources configurations, such as scope, degree, and institutional diversity, on 
performance (e.g., Contractor et al., 2003; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Hitt et al., 1997; 
Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Other research has also examined the 
impact of the external environment, including the institutional environment on 
multinational firm performance (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010).  However, the 
fit between the resources and the external environment is rarely explored in the 
international arena (for an exception see De la Torre, Esperança, & Martinez, 2010).  We 
propose in this study to tackle this issue of fit. 
More specifically, we propose that firms, over time, develop the resource and 
capabilities that are best suited to deal with their current external environment.  
Considering the importance of capitalizing on firms’ unique rare and valuable resources 
(Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1979), firms are likely to have a superior performance if they are 
able to reuse and capitalize on their fungible or expandable resources and capabilities in a 
new environment (Penrose, 1959).  Such an exploitation strategy is more likely to 
succeed when the current resources and capabilities are also valuable in the new 
environment, hence, when the new environment is somewhat similar or close to the 
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firms’ current external environment.  Focusing on the national environment, we propose 
that firms that operate in sets of countries that are ‘related’ are likely to have a superior 
performance to those that do not.  We coin the term international coherence, defined as 
the degree to which a Multinational Enterprise’s (MNE) network comprises countries that 
are related, to describe these firms. A high level of international coherence allows for the 
transfer of firms’ country-specific resources and capabilities from one specific country to 
others within the MNEs network, which is a key potential source of competitive 
advantage for MNEs (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003). 
We test the theory proposed using a sample of over 1,000 U.S. multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), and find support for the theory presented. It should be also noted that 
these results hold, even after controlling for the numerous dimensions of multinationality 
identified in past literature.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review first the relevant 
literature on the relationship between multinationality and firm performance, describing 
the evolution of the concept of multinationality. We also shortly review the past research 
on and the role of external institutional environment for MNEs’ performance. Then we 
introduce the concept of international coherence and develop the study’s hypothesis. The 
next section describes the methodology, measures and sample followed by a description 
of the empirical results and our conclusions. It is important to note that our approach 
likely addresses a key concern that has been raised on research on the relationship 
between multinationality and performance, namely the need to account for relatedness 
among countries within an MNE’s network (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Vachani, 1991; 
Verbeke & Brugman, 2009; Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009). 
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Literature Review 
 
External Environment Fit and MNE Performance 
The concept of “fit” originating in population ecology and contingency theory 
(Van de Ven, 1979; Venkatraman, 1989) is considered fundamental to strategic 
management (Schendel & Hofer, 1979; Venkatraman & Camillus, 1984), where it is 
conceptualized as the alignment of organizational competencies and resources with the 
opportunities and threats in the external environmental (Andrews, 1971; Chandler, 1962; 
Rumelt, 1974).  In a purely domestic context, the research on fit has in general provided 
evidence that the match of internal resources with the requirements of the external 
environment is beneficial for the organization (e.g., Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990; 
Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000). 
In the field of international business, the need for fit prominently appears in the 
Integration-Responsiveness (I/R) framework proposed by Prahalad (1975) and Doz 
(1976). According to this framework and through their multi-country activity, MNEs 
should be able to exploit market imperfections and capitalize on their worldwide 
competitive advantage (Roth & Morrison, 1990), while being responsive to the 
institutional environment in each location (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kostova, 1999; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  
While the I/R framework emphasizes the importance of considering the fit of an 
MNE’s strategy with the institutional context within each of the host countries, it doesn’t 
address how companies adapt to a variety of varying local contexts simultaneously 
(Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). Moreover, much of the current research on 
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multinationality ignores the issue of fit and rather focuses on the configuration of an 
MNEs’ international resources across the geographic space and its relationship with 
performance with more recent work focusing on the relationship between the external 
environment and performance, as reviewed below.   
 
MNE Internal Resources and Configuration and Performance 
While firm resources and capabilities are essential to success in both a domestic 
and an international context, IB research has highlighted the impact of two related sets of 
resources that apply only in the context of an MNE.  The first set is centers around the 
‘ownership’ advantage. The second set is multinationality as a resources and internal 
configuration across the geographic space.  As discussed below, both of these are 
generally explored without regard to fit with the external environment. 
The transfer of MNE’s resources in the form of firm-specific advantages (Hymer, 
1976) or “ownership advantages” (Dunning, 1977) has been at the root of most prominent 
FDI-theories. In fact, the ability to transfer, recombine, and exploit these resources across 
multiple contexts is considered the rationale for the existence of the MNE (Meyer et al., 
2011). The resources considered in descriptions of the ownership advantage are mostly 
different types of knowledge underlying technology, production, marketing, or other 
activities (e.g. Kogut & Zander, 1993). Several studies highlight the role that such 
intangible resources together with MNE’s experience play in improving MNE’s 
performance (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish, 2007; Gao, Pan, 
Lu, & Tao, 2008; Tallman & Chacar, 2011).  
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As the ownership advantage emerged into the limelight, multinationality, as a 
resource also became the focus of study.  Researchers initially contrasted multinational 
companies to purely domestic firms (Hymer, 1975; Stopford & Wells, 1972; Vernon, 
1971). In this research, multinationality itself is viewed as a resource (and at times a 
liability).  The conceptual logic underlying the investigation of the multinationality-
performance relationship mostly rests on the comparison of the incremental benefits and 
costs of internationalization (Ruigrok, Amman, & Wagner, 2007). On the benefits side, 
multinationality is expected to help exploit scale economies, engage in price 
discrimination and arbitrage knowledge acquisition, and have better and more flexible 
resources (Contractor et al., 2003; Hitt et al., 1997; Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1993). In 
addition, MNEs can exploit differences in government regulations and increase their 
bargaining power due to increased size (Thomas & Eden, 2004). Tallman and Li (1986) 
also emphasized the importance of the ability to manage extensive networks of 
international subsidiaries at low transactional costs, because multinationality creates 
opportunities to leverage strategic resources while simultaneously diversifying market 
risks, thus raising its performance (Kim et al., 1993). 
On the cost side, with increased presence in foreign countries, MNEs are more 
exposed to foreign exchange risks, to legitimacy issues due to multiple levels of 
authority, and greater cultural diversity, which is expected to increase the costs of 
operations (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Zaheer, 1995). 
After some earlier attempts to account for the dispersion of multinational 
activities across dissimilar geographic regions (Buhner, 1987; Grant, 1987; Kim, Hwang, 
& Burgers, 1989), research moved beyond a comparison of domestic firms to MNEs, 
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researchers emphasized the multidimensional nature of the multinationality construct 
(Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Sullivan, 1994) with researchers exploring 
the impact of international scope, degree, and institutional diversity, on MNE 
performance and a number of parallels drawn to product diversification theories (e.g., 
Contractor et al., 2003; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Hitt et al., 1997; Makino, Isobe, & 
Chan, 2004; Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Tong, Alessandri, Reuer, & 
Chintakananda, 2008). A distinction was established between degree and scope of 
international diversification, defined as the geographic range or breadth of the firm’s 
foreign presence (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Tallman and Li, 1996; Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2008).  The potential for arbitrage was also presented as a means to superior 
performance with the MNEs presumed to leverage location-specific advantages across 
their countries of operations (Kogut, 1985; Tallman & Li, 1996).  Others presented a 
power argument highlighting the potential for multipoint competition (Karnani & 
Wernerfelt, 1985). Following Vachani (1991), further distinction was made between 
related and unrelated international geographic diversification (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & 
Palich 1997; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000) with authors using different country 
categorizations (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985) to account for the 
diversity of investment locations of MNEs. 
 
External MNE Environment and Performance 
As in the broader management research, the IB field has highlighted the role of 
the external environment to firm performance with one major difference in emphasis. 
While the influence of the ‘‘environment’’ has long been investigated (e.g., Lawrence & 
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Lorsch, 1969), the emphasis has been on the task environment with the institutional 
environment mostly in the ‘‘background’’ (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). IB research has 
demonstrated that institutional frameworks differ substantially across countries (e.g., 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Prahalad and Doz, 
1987) and that this heterogeneity leads to context-specific industry structures and 
performance (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Ricart et al., 2004).  
Again, this research has been essential of our understandings of the impact of the MNE 
environment on its performance but has not explored the concept of fit. 
Compared to some factors of production that are increasingly mobile, formal and 
informal institutions “represent the major immobile factors in a globalized market” 
(Mudambi & Navarra, 2002: 636) and the costs and benefits of adapting MNE’s 
organization and governance to these conditions are important in determining the 
attractiveness of a location (Meyer et al., 2011). As Ingram and Silverman (2002: 20) put 
it: ‘‘institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to 
formulate and implement strategy and to create competitive advantage.’’  
Scott and Meyer (1983: 140, 149) defined task or technical environments as 
"those within which a product or service is exchanged in a market such that organizations 
are rewarded for effective and efficient control of the work process," in contrast to 
institutional environments that "are characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive 
support and legitimacy from the environment.” In a frequently used definition, 
institutions are the ‘‘rules of the game’’, or more formally ‘‘the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction’’ (North, 1990: 3).  
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Research on emerging economies, which differ substantially from developed 
economies in terms of institutions, has provided very valuable insights and empirical 
evidence demonstrating the importance of institutional factors in addition to industry- and 
resource-based factors (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Chacar & Vissa, 2005; 
Doh, Teegen, & Mudambi, 2004; McMillan, 2007). For example, Makino et al. (2004) 
found that country effects were as strong as industry effects, following affiliate and 
corporate effects, and that country effects were more salient in developing countries. 
Chacar and Vissa (2005) investigated manufacturing firms in the United States and India 
and demonstrated that poor firm performance persists longer in emerging economies than 
in developed ones. Chacar et al. (2010) in their recent longitudinal study of over 10,000 
firms from 33 countries, provided further evidence of the importance of formal 
institutions in the product, financial, and labor markets on firm performance persistence. 
Finally, Kim, Kim, and Hoskisson (2010) found that the stage of market-oriented 
institutional changes affects the relationship between international diversification and 
firm performance.  
All these studies and many others more point to the importance of the external 
environment for MNE-activity and that the heterogeneity in host countries’ institutional 
environments may influence the applicability of resource-based advantages (Brouthers, 
Brouthers, & Werner, 2008).  
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Theory Development 
 
The Role of International Coherence 
Previous research on the effects of multinationality on performance has focused 
almost exclusively on the extent of foreign investment or its dispersion among the 
countries without explicitly considering the MNEs’ resources or the diversity of the 
MNEs’ environment. By doing so, researchers have implicitly assumed that firm 
resources would be equally adapted to any foreign country, alternatively, the assumption 
is that national institutional environments outside of the home country are homogeneous. 
One exception is the study of Goerzen & Beamish (2003), in which the authors 
specifically point to the importance of considering country environment diversity and 
find evidence that this type of diversity is negatively associated with performance. 
We coined in this study the term international coherence, defined as the degree to 
which a Multinational Enterprise’s (MNE) network comprises countries that are related, 
to describe these firms. This term is inspired by Teece et al. (1994) concept of corporate 
coherence, describing firms that operate in relatively close technological and product 
market spaces, a concept that is distinct from product diversification. In a similar vein, 
International Coherence is distinct of geographic or international diversification.  MNEs 
might have a high level of international diversity but operate in countries that are 
relatively similar. Conversely, even at low levels of diversification operating in dissimilar 
environments increases environmental and internal governance complexity at the 
corporate level (Hutzschenreuter, Voll, & Verbeke, 2011; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and 
makes it more difficult to respond appropriately to local demands (Goerzen & Beamish, 
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2003). The knowledge that is created in distant countries will only marginally overlap 
with the existing knowledge making it more difficult for companies to learn from their 
local experience (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
We argue in this study that through selection and learning (Levinthal & March, 
1993) firms select resources and develop capabilities that are fit with their current 
environment. This prediction is in line with Pennings, Barkema, and Douma (1994: 610) 
who argued that expansions are more likely to succeed if they are similar and related to 
what a firm has done before. These resources and capabilities are an essential element to 
the success of firms, superior performance and a sustained competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1986, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984).  Changing these resources and capability is 
difficult (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) and incremental at best.  As such firms that can 
capitalize on their current resources and capabilities may perform better than other firms 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).   
Firms may also be able to enhance their performance by reutilizing their resources 
in new arenas, be it new product markets or new geographic markets (Penrose, 1959) and 
an MNE’s international expansion into new local contexts is one specific type of 
Penrosean growth (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Pitelis & Verbeke, 2007). This resource-
based view of a firm would suggest that a good approach to internationalization should 
entail expansion into countries which environment is somewhat similar to that of a firm’s 
current external environment. By definition, firms that operate in related countries have 
high levels of international coherence. Hence, firms with high international coherence 
should be able to reuse and capitalize on their existing resources and competencies better 
than those who don’t and achieve scope economies in resources usage. As a firm moves 
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to ‘neighboring’ country, it may also adapt its resources and improve of the experiential 
knowledge collected through previous expansions. Relatedness of countries of expansion 
allows MNEs not only to improve and refine their existing knowledge and routines 
(Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007) but also to apply existing concepts and linkages between 
them (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Following such adaptation, MNEs resources will 
become more readily transferable to the third countries or the neighboring countries to its 
neighbor countries and hence also likely to be more profitable.  In fact, experience in the 
host country, or similar countries, is shown to positively affect the performance and the 
survival rate of foreign subsidiaries (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007; Luo & Peng, 1999; 
Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997). Our theory is mostly consistent with a strategy of 
exploitation (March, 1991) which is likely to present lower risk levels and superior 
shorter-term performance.  Exploration is made possible also with resource adaptation 
allowing subsequent expansions and hence ensuring potentially long term performance.   
We hence propose that international coherence will lead to superior performance, 
or more formally: 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, International Coherence of an MNE is 
positively related to its performance. 
 
Methods 
 
Empirical Setting and Analytical Approach 
The primary source of data used in this study was OSIRIS, a product of Bureau 
van Dijk. OSIRIS collects data on all publicly traded companies worldwide. The data 
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includes financial as well as ownership information on all domestic and foreign 
investments. In particular this study focused on industrial U.S. MNEs that have 
investments abroad. After removing subsidiaries without host country information, we 
had an initial sample of 1,989 U.S. MNEs. In addition, for the companies in the sample, 
the data was complemented by financial information available through Compustat North 
America as well as segments data from Compustat Segments. As a result of missing data, 
we ended up with 1,001 firms that have been used in all empirical tests. 
 
Variable description and measurement 
Firm Performance. We measured firm performance using the Return on Assets 
(ROA) defined as Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the sum of Total Assets 
and Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization. ROA is often used in studies that 
investigate the relationship between different dimensions of multinationality and 
performance (e.g., Contractor et al., 2003; Geringer et al., 1989; Gomes & Ramaswamy, 
1999; Gomez-Meija & Palich, 1997; Hitt et al., 1997). As Hitt et al. (1997) argue, ROA 
together with Return on Sales (ROS) are more appropriate than Return on Equity (ROE), 
because they are less sensitive to differing capital structures. Between ROA and ROS, 
again in line with Hitt et al., (1997) we choose ROA, because some of our control 
variables are dependent on sales. 
International Coherence. The construction of our International Coherence 
measure (IC) went through several steps. In the first step we attach a value of relatedness 
to each pair of countries in which an MNE operates. Within the MNE’s network we 
distinguish between the MNE’s home country and host countries. The way in which we 
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capture the Home-Host Country Relatedness was demonstrated earlier (see Equations 1 
and 2 in Chapter I). In order to calculate the relatedness between two host countries we 
use another measure that is symmetrical, albeit both follow the survivor principle (Stigler, 
1968; Teece et al., 1994).  
In line with Teece et al. (1994) we find first the number of MNEs that have 
operations in both host country i and k. We compare this number with the number that 
would result if international diversification would be random, that is countries would be 
chosen randomly. If there are N MNEs worldwide, out of which ci have investments in 
country i and ck in country k, the number xik of firms that would, under the random 
choice hypothesis, invest in both countries follows a hypergeometric distribution. That is, 
 
ܲݎሾ ௜ܺ௞ ൌ ݔሿ ൌ ு݂ீሺݔ, ܰ, ܿ௜, ܿ௞ሻ ൌ
ቀܿ௜ݔቁ ൬
ܰ െ ܿ௜
ܿ௞ െ ݔ൰
൬ܰܿ௞൰
 
Equation 8: Hypergeometric distribution 
 
The mean for this distribution is: 
ߤ௜௞ ൌ
ܿ௜ܿ௞
ܰ  
and the variance: 
ߪ௜௞ଶ ൌ
ܿ௜ܿ௞ሺܰ െ ܿ௜ሻሺܰ െ ܿ௞ሻ
ܰଶሺܰ െ 1ሻ  
Equation 9: Mean and standard deviation of hypergeometric distribution 
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If the observed number Mik of firms that invest in both countries i and k 
substantially exceeds μik, then we say that the two countries are strongly related. More 
precisely, the measure of relatedness is: 
ܵܥܴ௜௞ ൌ
ܯ௜௞ െ ߤ௜௞
ߪ௜௞  
Equation 10: Formula for SCRik 
 
As in the case of HHCRij, the symmetric measure is appropriately transformed to 
range from -1 to +1.  
In the second step we use this measure to build a Relatedness Matrix for each 
MNE. As an illustration, in Table 10 we present the Relatedness Matrix for TJX 
COMPANIES INC., an MNE that has operations in seven countries, including the U.S., 
its home country. 
 
Table 10: Relatedness matrix for TJX COMPANIES INC. 
 CA DE GB HK IE PR US 
CA  0.55 0.59 0.41 0.62 0.35 0.57 
DE 0.55  0.57 0.27 0.56 0.27 0.04 
GB 0.59 0.57  0.17 0.54 0.2 0.28 
HK 0.41 0.27 0.17  0.45 0.32 -0.41 
IE 0.62 0.56 0.54 0.45  0.42 0.28 
PR 0.35 0.27 0.2 0.32 0.42  0.72 
US 0.57 0.04 0.28 -0.41 0.28 0.72  
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Figure 1: Countries’ Network for TJX COMPANIES INC 
  
Abbreviations: CA - Canada, DE - Germany, GB - United Kingdom, HK - Hong 
Kong, IE - Ireland, PR - Puerto Rico, US - United States of America 
 
For an MNE that has investments in n countries there are n(n-1)/2 pairs of 
relatedness measures among countries. In the case of TJX COMPANIES INC., there are 
21 links (see Figure 1; the relatedness measures are shown only for a couple of links in 
that Figure). However, a subset of only n - 1 links among countries can create a 
connected graph that includes them all. If this subset has the property that the sum of the 
relatedness measures on each link is largest, it is called the maximum spanning tree 
(MST). The MST for TJX COMPANIES INC. has 6 links (shown in Figure 2). 
 
 
 
US 
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CA
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.17
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Figure 2: Maximum Spanning Tree for TJX COMPANIES INC. 
 
Abbreviations: CA - Canada, DE - Germany, GB - United Kingdom, HK - Hong Kong, 
IE - Ireland, PR - Puerto Rico, US - United States of America 
 
The last step is to use the MST to calculate an overall measure of IC. First, we 
weigh each of the countries in terms of importance they have for the MNE. While MNE’s 
sales by country, or the actual size of investments in each of the countries would be 
preferable as weights, they are not systematically available (Delios, Xu, & Beamish, 
2008). Instead, we consider the count of an MNE’s investments weighted by the 
percentage ownership in each country as a measure of size and the percentage to the total 
number of MNE’s investments as weight (e.g., Delios et al., 2008; Sullivan, 1994). In 
Figure 2, we have included the number of subsidiaries next to each country code. For 
instance, TJX COMPANIES INC. has 3 subsidiaries in Germany, only one in Puerto 
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IE 
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CA 
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GB 
(4) PR (1) 
HK 
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Rico, and 61 in the U.S. For each of the countries in the network, we calculate the 
average relatedness across the links that are part of the MST. Finally, denoting wi the 
weight and ri the relatedness of country ci, the IC for a given MNE would be: 
 
ܫܥ ൌ෍ݓ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
∗ ݎ௜ 
Equation 11: Formula for IC 
 
Control Variables. We controlled for several firm and industry characteristics that 
might also affect performance.  
To control for firm effects, we included in our models Firm Size which we 
measured by firm sales (SALES). A firm’s size can potentially increase its market power 
and its ability to dominate its industry and generate larger profits (Chang & Thomas, 
1989).  We also corrected for firm age (AGE), which we measured to the year 2007. Age 
has been hypothesized to affect firm’s performance (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Sørensen & 
Stuart, 2000). We also corrected for innovation using R&D-intensity, measured as the 
ratio of R&D-expenditure ratio to total sales (RDINT), as a resource factor that can 
increase the firm’s product differentiation vis-à-vis its competitors and hence a firm’s 
profitability. In cases where firms didn’t report R&D-expenditures or reported 
insignificant amounts we considered the values to be zero, but added also a dummy 
variable (RDDUM), which takes a value of 1 when there are no R&D-expenditures and 0 
otherwise. In order to control for the overall importance of foreign operations, we 
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included also the degree of internationalization, which we measured using the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales (FSTS). This measure has been widely used in the research on 
the effects of multinationality on performance (e.g., Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999; Grant, 
Jammine, & Thomas, 1988; Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Wiersema and 
Bowen, 2008). Finally, we controlled for firm’s previous performance, using ROA for 
year 2007 (ROA-1), a method that helps control for fixed firm effects in cross-sectional 
data.   
The extent of industry competition is also likely to affect firms’ performance 
(e.g., Andrews, 1971; Bain, 1951; Porter, 1980).  To account for this important factor, we 
controlled for industry concentration using the Herfindahl-index (HERF) (Herfindahl, 
1950; Hirschman, 1945), computed as the sum of the squared firm’s sales as a fraction of 
total industry sales (4-digit SIC code). In addition we controlled for industry profitability 
(INDPROF) defined as Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by Sales (net), 
calculated at 4-digit level of SIC-code. For both measures we used the full Compustat 
data set for the year 2007. 
 
Model 
We use OLS regression to examine the relationship between international 
coherence and firm performance using the following model: 
 
ROA = β0 + β1*INDPROF + β2*HERF + β3*AGE + β4*SALES + β5*RDINT + 
β6*RDDUM +   β7*ROA-1 + β8*FSTS + ε        
Equation 12: Statistical model 1 for ROA 
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All the control and independent measures are measured for the year 2007 while 
ROA is measured in the year 2008. 
 
Results 
 
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics as well as the correlations for the variables 
used in our model. ROA is positively and significantly correlated with IC as well as with 
AGE and the two industry variables: INDPROF and HERF, albeit the correlations are 
low. Not surprisingly, the correlation between ROA and ROA-1 is significant and 
relatively high (0.57). However, the correlation between ROA and RDINT is negative 
and significant (-0.4). 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
    Mean 
Std. 
Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) ROA 0.31 17.4 1               
(2) INDPROF 6.3 6.6 0.08* 1        
(3) HERF 0.28 0.23 0.07* -0.06 1       
(4) AGE 42.74 37.01 0.12* -0.06* 0.09* 1      
(5) SALES 6.33 18.78 0.06 0.004 0.006 0.12* 1     
(6) RDINT 0.92 24.15 -0.4* 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 1    
(7) ROA-1 4.01 10.2 0.57* 0.1* 0.1* 0.09* 0.06 -0.44* 1   
(8) FSTS 0.34 0.27 0.02 0.12* -0.08* 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.03 1 
(9) IC 0.57 0.17 0.11* 0.05 0.01 0.1* 0.09* -0.04 0.11* 0.29* 
* significant at 0.05 
 
Table 12 shows the results of OLS regressions predicting ROA. For all the models 
we used a balanced dataset of 1,001 observations for which data on all variables were 
available. M1 is the base model not including ROA-1 and FSTS. M2 adds FSTS to M1, 
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while M3 and M4 add our main independent variable IC to M1 and M2, respectively. 
Models M5 to M8 are built in a similar way, but they all include in addition also ROA-1 
as a control. 
Robustness Checks. To test for the robustness of our results, we conducted 
several additional tests. We tested models M1 to M4 replacing FSTS, first with the 
number of countries where an MNE operates as a proxy for the scope of diversification, 
and then with an entropy measure of product diversification, which we calculated using 
business segment data (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993; Jacquemin & Berry, 
1979). In both cases IC remained significant. The results didn’t change even when we 
used the related or unrelated components of product diversification (following Hoskisson 
et al. (1993: 222), we defined related diversification as “the diversification arising from 
operating in four-digit segments within a two-digit industry group” and unrelated 
diversification as “the diversification arising from operating between two-digit industry 
groups”, with total firm sales as the sales reference in both cases).     
In addition to our main measure of IC, we use an alternative one, in which we 
used the simple (not weighted) count of subsidiaries in a country as measure of size. 
While the first measure provides a more accurate picture, data on ownership is not always 
available and the reporting not always standardized. The two measures were highly 
correlated (above 0.98) and the results changed very little (although, there was a slight 
drop in significance for models M7 and M8). 
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Table 12: Explaining MNE performance with International Coherence 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
INDPROF 0.3(3.1)*** 0.3(3)*** 0.3(2.9)*** 0.3(2.9)*** 0.1(1.2) 0.1(1.2) 0.1(1.2) 0.1(1.2) 
HERF 4.5(2.6)*** 4.4(2.5)* 4.5(2.6)** 4.3(2.4)* 1.4(1) 1.3(0.9) 1.4(1) 1.3(0.9) 
AGE 0.1(5.1)*** 0.05(5.2)*** 0.05(5)*** 0.05(5)*** 0.04(4.1)*** 0.04(4.1)*** 0.03(3.9)*** 0.03(4)*** 
SALES 0.04(3)*** 0.04(3)*** 0.04(2.8)*** 0.04(2.8)*** 0.02(2.1)* 0.02(2.1)* 0.02(1.9)† 0.02(1.9)† 
RDINT -0.3(-7.6)*** -0.3(-7.5)*** -0.3(-7.6)*** -0.3(-7.6)*** -0.1(-3.7)*** -0.1(-3.6)*** -0.1(-3.7)*** -0.1(-3.7)*** 
RDDUM 0.6(0.7) 0.58(0.58) 1.03(1.03) 0.8(0.8) 0.08(0.09) 0.02(-0.02) 0.3(0.3) 0.1(0.1) 
ROA-1     0.8(4.7)*** 0.8(4.7)*** 0.8(4.7)*** 0.8(4.7)*** 
FSTS  -0.3(-0.1)  -1.8(-0.6)  -0.7(-0.3)  -1.5(-0.6) 
IC   8(2.34)* 8.7(2.51)*   4.2(1.71)† 4.8(1.8)† 
_cons -5.1(-3.9)*** -5(-2.9)*** -9.5(-3.6)*** -9.3(-3.4)*** -5.5(-4.8)*** -5.3(-3.7)*** -7.5(-3.9)*** -7.7(-3.8)*** 
F-value 15.57 13.38 13.51 11.88 17.99 15.82 15.8 14.15 
Prob > F <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
R-squared 0.1876 0.1876 0.1938 0.1944 0.3565 0.3566 0.3582 0.3586 
† significant at 0.1, * significant at 0.05, **significant at 0.01, ***significant at 0.001 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our tests demonstrate that international coherence, as a way of capturing the 
MNEs’ overall fit with its multiple host country environments, is an important construct 
for international business. We found evidence that maintaining a high level of 
international coherence is beneficial for the MNEs. Firms that are characterized by high 
levels of international coherence are able to capitalize on their existing resources and 
competencies better than those who don’t and achieve scope economies in resources 
usage. In addition, MNEs that operate in related countries both improve their existing 
knowledge base (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007) and apply existing concepts and linkages 
between them (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Hence resources will become more readily 
transferable to the third countries.   
Our finding that firms characterized by high levels of IC remain close to their 
knowledge base in their international expansion moves, which allows them to exploit 
their existing knowledge and routines, is also in line with previous research in 
organizational learning (Levinthal & March, 1993; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994). 
The results obtained are similar to the study by Goerzen and Beamish (2003) that 
found that country environment diversity is negatively associated with performance, 
albeit we capture the combination of diversity as they name it, and fit. The results are also 
in line with other studies that contend that doing business in heterogeneous countries 
leads to lower performance for MNEs (e.g., Li and Guisinger, 1992; Chang, 1995) or 
their subsidiaries (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish, 
2007).  
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While other studies have found no such effects (e.g., Brouthers, Brouthers, & 
Werner, 2008), or even that dissimilarity was associated with lower rate of joint venture 
dissolution (Park & Ungson, 1997), the inconsistent findings maybe, at least in part, a 
result of conceptual and/or methodological issues related to the construct of country 
similarities (Shenkar, 2001). In fact, what construct is used to capture similarity (e.g., 
cultural distance, psychic distance, institutional distance) and what dimensions are used, 
remains largely at the discretion of the researcher. This, in turn, is translated into non-
comparable approaches to conceptualization and measurement of country diversity, or 
heterogeneity at firm level. Our conceptualization of international coherence provides a 
more researcher-independent approach due to its reliance on the concept of country 
relatedness, which is revealed by the actual patterns of international investments made by 
multinational firms between any two countries. In addition, our conceptualization of 
country relatedness doesn’t require that related countries be similar. Certain countries 
might be often combined because of complementarities, rather than similarities. Here, we 
agree with other authors that managing MNEs is not about creating homogeneity, but 
about ‘managing differences’ (Ghemawat, 2007; Meyer et al., 2011). 
In Chapter II we argued that managers use heuristics for their international 
investment decisions and that these heuristics led the MNEs invest close to the home 
country. While this describes the behavior of the average firm, specific firms might take 
different paths depending on their specific bundles of resources. The empirical evidence 
we found in this paper, namely that maintaining a high level of IC has a positive effect on 
performance of the MNEs, shows that the heuristics used by managers can be beneficial, 
in line with previous research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1124; Bingham, Eisenhardt, 
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& Furr, 2007). The fact that firms that remain close to their knowledge base succeed, 
together with the finding of the previous chapter that managers are cognitively driven to 
search locally, provides evidence that superior performance is the result of “superior 
ability to manage the cognitive processes underlying the intelligence of local action” 
(Gavetti, 2009: 3; Gavetti et al., 2005). 
Finally, our study brings also a methodological contribution by introducing a new 
measure of international coherence that is based on the survivor measure of country 
relatedness. As such it is more appropriate for the needs of international business research 
and is free from researcher’s bias.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and Sources (Chapter I) 
Variable Description Source 
HHCRij Home Host Country Relatedness 1 
HCCj Host Country Connectedness 1 
BHCRij Bridge to Host Country Relatedness 1 
Diff. in religion Differences in religion 2 
Diff. in education Differences in education 2 
Diff. in industrial development Differences in industrial development 2 
Diff. in languages Differences in languages 2 
Diff. in POLCON Differences in political constraints (POLCON V) 3 
Diff in POLITY IV Difference in the Modified POLITY IV 4 
Diff. in the FHPR Difference in the Freedom House Political Rights 5 
Diff. in the FHCL Difference in the Freedom House Civil Liberties 5 
Diff. in Political Ideology Difference in Beck's Political Ideology 6 
Colonial Relations Dummy: 1 if one of the countries was colony of the other or they had the same colonizer; 0 otherwise 7 
Same Country Dummy: 1 if the countries have been part of the same country; 0 otherwise 7 
Distance in Legal Systems Distance in legal systems 8 
Contiguous countries Dummy: 1 if countries are contiguous; 0 otherwise 7 
Geographic distance Geographic Distance as an weighted average considering main cities 7 
 
1: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau van Dijk/Osiris 
2: Dow & Karunaratna (2006) 
3: POLCON (Henisz, 2000) 
4: Gleditsch, K. S. (2008) 
5: Freedom House 
6: Beck, T., Clarke, G., et al. (2001) 
7: CEPII database on bilateral distances 
8: Author’s calculation based on JuriGlobe project of the University of Ottawa 
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Appendix 2: Home Host Country Relatedness for OECD Countries 
 AT AU BE CA CH CL CZ DE DK ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT JP KR LU MX NL NO NZ PL PT SE SI SK TR US 
AT  -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 0.2 -0.6 0.9 0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 0.9 -0.9 -1.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.9 0.9 0.6 -0.7 
AU -0.9  -0.6 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 1.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 
BE 0.0 -0.5  -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 -1.0 0.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.7 -0.3 0.6 -0.2 -0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.2 
CA -0.7 -0.1 -0.7  -0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -1.0 -0.9 -0.7 0.5 
CH 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1  -0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.3 
CL -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0  -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 
CZ 0.5 -1.0 0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0  0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 1.0 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.6 -0.1 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.9 1.0 0.4 -0.9 
DE 0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 
DK 0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.8 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.8 -0.2 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4 -0.6 
ES 0.3 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.9 0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -0.9 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 -0.9 -0.9 0.2 0.7 0.1 -0.7 -0.9 -0.3 0.9 -0.8 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 
FI 0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.7 -0.6 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 -0.3 -0.5 
FR -0.1 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
GB -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.7 -0.4 0.1 0.3 
GR 0.1 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.7 0.4 -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 0.0 -1.0 -0.9 0.2 0.0 0.8 -0.7 
HU 0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 0.9 0.1 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 0.9 0.4 -0.9 
IE -0.8 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.8 -0.4 -1.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.2 -0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.3 
IS -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.3 -1.0 0.4 0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 -1.0 0.6 0.3 -0.5 
IT 0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1  0.2 0.0 0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.0 
JP -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 -0.3  0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 0.2 
KR -0.2 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.5 0.7 -0.2 0.1 
LU 0.0 -0.5 0.7 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.4 0.1 0.4 -0.3 -1.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 0.3 0.1 -1.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 -0.6 
MX -1.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 0.1 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 
NL 0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 
NO -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -0.2 
NZ -1.0 0.9 -0.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -1.0 -0.5 0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.2 
PL 0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 -1.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.2 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 0.6 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 -0.8 
PT -0.4 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -1.0 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.9 -1.0 0.2 -0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.9 -1.0 0.3 -0.9 0.3 -1.0 -1.0 0.8 -0.8 -1.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 
SE 0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.2 -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.1 0.9 -0.6 0.5 -0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.4 
SI 0.7 0.3 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.6 0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 0.2 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 -1.0 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 -0.5 
SK 0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 -1.0 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0 0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
TR 0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -1.0 0.6 0.3 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.6 0.4 -0.8 
US -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0  
Abbreviations: AT-Austria, AU-Australia, BE-Belgium, CA-Canada, CH-Switzerland, CL-Chile, CZ-Czech Republic, DE-Germany, DK-Denmark, ES-
Estonia, FI-Finland, FR-France, GB-United Kingdom, GR-Greece, HU-Hungary, IE-Ireland, IS-Island, IT-Italy, JP-Japan, KR-South Korea, LU-
Luxembourg, MX-Mexico, NL-Netherlands, NO-Norway, NZ-New Zealand, PL-Poland, PT-Portugal, SE-Sweden, SI-Slovenia, SK-Slovakia, TR-Turkey, 
US-United States of America 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions and Sources (Chapter II) 
 
Variable Measure Source 
Contiguous Countries Dummy =1 for contiguous pairs of countries and 0 otherwise  1 
Geographic Distance The weighted average distance between the main cities of the home and host country (unit = 100 km). 1 
Common Official 
Language Dummy=1 if the two countries have the same official language. 1 
Colonial Relations Dummy=1 if the two countries ever had a colonial ink or a common colonizer and 0 otherwise.  1 
Same Country Dummy=1 if the two countries were part of the same country and 0 otherwise.  1 
Distance in Legal 
Systems 
Sum of squared differences on 4 legal systems dummies corresponding to Civil, 
Common, Customary, and Muslim Law. In case of countries with mixed systems, 
equal weights were assigned to all relevant systems. 
2 
Distance in Religion Difference between the dominant religions in the countries in the pair as well as the incidence of each country’s dominant religion in the other country 3 
Distance in Property 
Rights Protection Absolute value of difference of countries’ standardized POLCON scores 4 
Distance in Contracting 
Institutions  
Absolute value of difference of countries’ standardized ‘Index of procedural 
formalism based on check collection’ score 5 
Distance in Shareholder 
Rights 
Absolute value of difference of countries’ standardized scores of the ‘Anti-self-
dealing index’. It describes the strength of minority shareholder protection against 
self-dealing by the controlling shareholder 
6 
Distance in Labor 
Protection  
Absolute value difference in countries’ standardized average of ‘Employment 
Laws Index’, ‘Collective Relations Laws Index’, and ‘Social Security Laws 
Index’ scores 
7 
CMRA Dummy=1 if both countries are part of any common Regional Agreement (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, and CARICOM) and 0 otherwise. 8 
1. CEPII database on bilateral distances. 
2. JuriGlobe project of the University of Ottawa 
3. Dow and Karunaratna (2006). 
4. Henisz (2000). 
5. Djankov et al. (2003). 
6. Djankov et al. (2008) 
7. Botero et al. (2004). 
8. Authors’ calculation based on data from World Trade Organisation. 
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